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In 2015, Germany introduced a statutory hourly minimum wage that was not only universally 
binding but also set at a relatively high level. By focusing on the short-run effects of the German 
Minimum Wage Reform, I estimate its impact on employment. Using a difference-in-differences 
framework, I exploit variation in the regional treatment intensity, assuming that the stronger a 
minimum wage ‘bites’ into the regional wage distribution, the stronger the regional labor market, 
and thus employment, will be affected. The data source I use is the German Socio-Economic Panel 
(SOEP). After verifying the absence of anticipation effects and testing the common trend 
assumption in wages and employment size, I estimate non significative coefficients of the 
interaction terms between the regional bite in 2014 and years from 2012 to 2017. However, these 
results allow me to assess that labor markets could be characterized by monopsonistic aspects, 
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Ensuring that workers earn adequate wages is an important element to guarantee decent 
working and living conditions, as well as to build fair and resilient economies and societies. During 
the last decades, in the European Union, many Member States have not kept up with their levels of 
wages. Labor markets are constantly being reshaped, characterized by an increasing job 
polarization and a rising share of low-paid and low-skilled occupations, due to structural trends 
such as digitalization or the rise in non-standard forms of work. In this way, the traditional 
collective bargaining structure is being eroded, while wage inequality has become a common issue 
among all Member States of the European Union. 
When set at an appropriate level, minimum wages guarantee adequate living conditions for 
workers, helps sustain domestic demand, strengthens incentives to work, and reduces inequality at 
the lower part of the wage distribution. This, in turn, helps improving the fairness of the EU labor 
market and promoting economic and social progress. Minimum wage protection can be provided 
by collective agreements or by statutory minimum wages set by law. However, many workers are 
currently not protected by adequate minimum wages in the EU. During economic downturns, the 
role of minimum wages becomes even more important. The Covid-19 crisis has particularly hit 
sectors with a higher share of low-paid jobs (such as retail and tourism) and has had a stronger 
impact on the disadvantaged groups of the population. Adequate wage floors can help reduce the 
gender pay gap, since more women than men belong to the lower part of the income distribution. 
It also helps protect employers that pay decent wages to workers by ensuring fair competition. In 
light of this, the Political Guidelines for the Commission 2019-2024 announced an Action Plan to 
fully implement Principle 6 of the European Pillar of Social Rights. The proposed Directive aims 
to ensure that all workers in the Union are protected by adequate minimum wages. In order to reach 
this general objective, the proposal establishes a framework to improve the adequacy of minimum 
wages and to increase the access of workers to minimum wage protection. 
In the countries where the collective bargaining coverage is higher, a lower share of low-wage 
workers is usually more common to be encountered, alongside with higher wage floors relative to 
the median wage, lower inequality, and higher wages than other countries. There are some Member 
States where minimum wage protection is exclusively provided by collective agreements, implying 
that the share of workers protected is directly determined by the functioning of the collective 
bargaining system. However, in Member States where statutory minimum wages are effectively 
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put in place, collective bargaining remains a very important element for the minimum wage 
adequacy. In these countries, the proposal aims at guaranteeing the conditions to set statutory 
minimum wages at adequate levels, without forgetting about socio-economic conditions and 
regional and sectoral differences. The proposed Directive also aims at achieving further 
improvements in adequacy by setting a limit to the application of variations of statutory minimum 
wage rates for specific sectors, or group of workers. Workers may also not be adequately protected 
by minimum wages because of lack of compliance with the existing collective agreements or 
national legal provisions. Ensuring compliance and effective enforcement is essential for workers 
to benefit from the introduction of the minimum wage and businesses to be protected from unfair 
competition. Therefore, the proposed Directive aims at promoting compliance as well as 
strengthening enforcement and monitoring in all Member States in a proportionate way. 
The labor market has always been represented by the perfectly competitive model in the 
classical economic theory, which predicts that workers will be paid exactly equal to their marginal 
revenue product. According to this assumption, every intervention in the market made by the 
government will be inefficient and will reduce social welfare. The classical view suggests that if 
employers decrease wage rates by an infinitesimal amount, workers should immediately cut their 
labor supply, or leave their current job to pursue better options outside. This argument is too 
simplistic as it does not consider various important elements that discourage workers from reacting 
that way, such as non-compete agreements, geographic isolation, or moving costs. In a more 
realistic labor market, workers may be reluctant to look for different options and firms possess 
monopsony power. The employment effects predicted by the perfectly competitive model are then 
questioned by the monopsonistic model, as it could not be true that an increase in wage rates would 
lead to a reduction in employment size. 
 The first economist to write about imperfect competition in labor markets was Joan Robinson 
in 1933, using for the first time the term “monopsony”. Before then, economists only focused on 
market power in product markets, showing the social harm of a monopoly. Only in recent years, 
researchers started to indicate that labor markets are better represented by imperfect competitive 
models. Increasing inequality in the income distribution and a falling labor share in national income 
have led to renewed interest in the idea that there is an imbalance in economic power between 
employers and workers in the labor market. The main idea behind monopsony is that the labor 
supply curve to an individual employer is not infinitely elastic, as the perfectly competitive model 
assume. If an employer reduces wages by an infinitesimal amount, it will not instantly lose all its 
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workers to competitors, due to different factors. Employees could have preferences that are 
excluded from their wage rates, such as the geographical location of their workplace, or other 
amenities that are offered by their job position, which prevent them from looking for different 
options outside. Non-monetary costs are another important element that prevent workers from 
immediately leaving their current position when facing a reduction in their wage, as there are search 
frictions which make it costly for them in time or effort terms to look for different opportunities 
outside. Thus, monopsony can explain why the introduction of a minimum wage may not always 
result in a reduction of social welfare, as, in some cases, it could also lead to an increase in the 
level of employment. 
Monopsony power and employment effects of minimum wages have already been analyzed by 
researchers, mostly looking at federal minimum wages introduced in the United States. In this 
article I analyzed the introduction of the statutory minimum wage in Germany in 2015. On January 
1, 2015, the reform became effective, setting a general statutory wage floor of €8.50 per hour. 
Before its introduction, there were only sector-specific wage floors set by collective agreements. It 
was a major intervention in the labor market, due to the very high “bite” of the reform: almost all 
employees were eligible for its application, given the very limited legal exemptions, and around 10 
to 14 percent of those eligible workers were actually earning less than the new minimum before 
2015. Due to the high percentage of affected employees, the German case reveals to be interesting 
since this reform can give insights into potential minimum wage effects even beyond the German 
context. The reform put in place was preceded by long debates about its potential effects, mostly 
on employment size. Critics of the reform predicted that it would have led to a massive job 
destruction, while supporters stressed positive distributional effects and fairness. The analysis 
conducted in this article provides evidence on the short run employment effects of the reform, 
based on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). The analysis uses a difference-in-
differences regression framework (DiD) with continuous treatment, built on regional variation in 
treatment intensity, measured by the ratio of eligible workers who earned less than €8.50 prior to 
the introduction of the reform and the total population employed. The statutory minimum wage 
applies equally to all German areas, but the wage structures across Germany’s 
Raumordnungsregionen (ROR) show some differences. 
The first chapter of this paper focuses on reviewing the existing literature on monopsony 
and market power in labor markets in general. The first part explains the theoretical case of the 
monopsony model in a labor market, where the possible positive effects of the introduction of a 
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policy that establish a certain minimum level of wages are compared to the classical case of perfect 
competition, where any intervention in the market by the government results in a failure. In a 
monopsonistic labor market, the socially optimal quantity of a good or a service is not produced, 
resulting in the so-called deadweight loss, which gives a measure for the wasteful misallocation of 
resources. According to the research conducted in the article Monopsony in labor markets: a review 
(Manning, 2020), the most direct way to assess the importance of monopsony is to estimate the 
wage elasticity of the labor supply curve to individual firms. The first part of the paper discusses 
the work that has been done to model the monopsony power of employers according to two 
different methods: ‘modern’ monopsony based on search frictions in the labor market and ‘new 
classical’ monopsony based on thin labor markets deriving from idiosyncratic tastes among 
workers. The second part of the paper tries to show how monopsony can be useful in understanding 
a wider range of labor market phenomena, besides the introduction of a minimum wage. Some are 
well-established (e.g. the gender pays gap) while others are emerging (e.g. immigration, wage 
inequality, and the labor share) and monopsony has the potential to improve our knowledge of 
labor markets. 
In the article A generalized model of Monopsony (Manning, 2006) the authors assume a 
critical view of both perfect competition and monopsony, arguing that, if the first model is extreme 
in assuming that a wage cut of one cent leads all the workers employed to quit instantaneously to 
look for a new opportunity outside, the assumption of the monopsony model implying that a firm 
can only grow in employment size raising the wage rate (and moving along an upward-sloping 
labor supply curve) seems implausible. The crucial point of this article is that employers have the 
possibility of increasing the flow of recruits also spending more resources. A more realistic model 
is presented by the authors, where the supply of labor to an individual employer is influenced by 
the wage rate and expenditure on recruitment activity. Starting from the assumption that the wage 
elasticity of the labor supply to an individual firm is finite, diseconomies of scale in recruitment 
for a given wage becomes the new discriminant to assess whether a labor market is better 
approximated by the perfectly competitive model or by monopsony. In this way, perfect 
competition is not considered anymore as a situation where the wage elasticity of the labor supply 
curve to an individual firm is infinite (which goes against both common sense and empirical 
evidence), but as one in which the marginal cost of recruiting a worker is independent of the level 
of employment. Monopsony, on the other hand, identifies the situation in which the marginal cost 
of maintaining a given stock of workers is increasing in employment. This model is considered as 
a generalized model of monopsony. 
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The second chapter of this article discusses the massive intervention in the wage structure that 
took place in Germany in 2015 with the introduction of the Minimum Wage Reform. The policy 
had a large impact on labor market, as the share of affected workers was very high, due to the 
universality of the reform with very few legal exemptions. The chapter presents the two different 
currents of thoughts that anticipated the introduction of the reform and tried to predict what the 
effects of a wage floor could be, especially on the national employment level. Then, different 
identification strategies are presented, explaining why, due to the universal validity of the reform 
and some non-compliance issues, the set of empirical identification strategies is considerably 
restricted in the German case. Following the identification approach proposed by Card (1992), 
which considers regional variation that does not depend on differences in legislation, it is possible 
to evince that the stronger that a minimum wage ‘bites’ into the regional wage distribution, the 
stronger the regional labor market is affected, and so should be the adaptation of labor demand. 
In the third chapter, the difference-in-differences analysis is presented. The focus is on the 
short run employment effects. Using the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) as the main data 
source, all the relevant variables that are part of the regression are presented. Year 2014 is taken as 
the reference point and all the coefficients of interests of the interaction terms between the level of 
the bite in 2014 and the other years have to be interpreted in relation to that year. Besides the 
inclusion of time- and region-fixed effects, GDP per capita and population size are used as control 
variables according to the assumption that the economic power of a specific ROR will have an 
impact on its employment size and employment is also obviously affected by population. Standard 
errors are clustered at the ROR’s level. The main results presented are divided into different 
subcategories of employees. Results are estimated using overall employment as the dependent 
variable, as well as marginal and regular employment. Two further distinctions are then conducted, 
looking at the different impact that the reform have on males and females separately, as well as 









1. The Economics of Imperfect Competition 
 
In her State of the Union address on 16 September 2020, President Ursula von der Leyen 
stated that: “The truth is that for too many people, work no longer pays. Dumping wages destroys 
the dignity of work, penalizes the entrepreneur who pays decent wages and distorts fair competition 
in the Single Market. This is why the Commission will put forward a legal proposal to support 
Member States to set up a framework for minimum wages. Everyone must have access to minimum 
wages either through collective agreements or through statutory minimum wages.”1 
Ensuring that workers earn adequate wages is essential to guarantee adequate working and 
living condition, as well as to promote fair economic and social progress. The increasing share of 
low-paid and low-skilled occupations have contributed to wage inequality. Debates about the 
desirability and consequences of labor market interventions like minimum wages, trade unions, 
welfare benefits, hours restrictions and firing costs continue to be at the heart of discussions about 
the way in which modern industrialized economies should be run. The merit of interventions is 
mostly put in terms of a trade-off between efficiency and equality. Employment effects have long 
been at the center of minimum wage research, questioning whether and how a minimum rate affects 
jobs, employee numbers and hours of work. The proposal of minimum wages arises in order to 
improve the standard of living of those households that are most vulnerable in the labor market, 
but, if it represents a threat for the employment of many of those same people, a serious analysis 
should be run to evaluate the relative costs and benefits of such a proposal. Different economic 
theories lead to different predictions. According to the model of perfectly competitive labor 
markets, minimum wages increase the cost of labor above the marginal productivity of workers 
and decrease the level of employment, leading to welfare inefficiencies. But, if employers have 
some market power over their workers, as a number of authors have argued in recent years, an 
unregulated market shows monopsonistic aspects, and this is likely to lead to a more positive view 
of labor market interventions. The foundation for this broader way of thinking about imperfect 
competition is widely attributed to Joan Robinson. In her book The Economics of Imperfect 
Competition (19692) she refers to the case of a single buyer confronted in a market by many sellers. 
The microeconomic theory of monopsony assumes the single entity to have market power over all 
 
1 Source: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/ov/SPEECH_20_1655 
2 Robinson attributes the term monopsony, derived from ancient Greek, to B.L. Hallward of Peterhouse, Cambridge. 
See Robinson (1969), p. 215. Note that Robinson’s classic book, The Economics of Imperfect Competition, was first 
published in 1933. The 1969 publication date refers to the second edition. 
16 
 
sellers as the only purchaser of a good or service. This situation recalls the market power of a 
monopolist, which can influence the price for its buyers as the only seller of a good or service. It 
had long been clear that large corporations like Standard Oil monopolized goods and services, but 
Robinson realized that corporations also exercised market power on the buy side, in their purchases 
of inputs, including labor. The monopsony power of corporations was just as common as their 
monopoly power, perhaps more common, but harder to detect. In economic literature the term 
monopsony is predominantly used when referring to labor market, however it could be applied to 
any industry. The key idea behind monopsony is that the labor supply curve to an individual 
employer is not infinitely elastic. An employer who cuts wages by an infinitesimal amount may 
find it harder to recruit workers but does not immediately lose all their existing workers to 
competitors as the perfectly competitive model would predict. Therefore, monopsony can help 
explain why labor market interventions, such as a statutory minimum wage floor, may not always 
reduce employment. 
A monopsonistic labor market is characterized by a firm that has market power in 
employing factors of production (labor, in this case). Considering a situation where there is only 
one major employer and many workers looking for employment, that firm has market power in 
setting wages and choosing how many workers to employ. The most common examples of 
monopsony in labor markets are a coal mine owner in a small town in the countryside where mining 
is the primary source of employment3, or the government in the employment of nurses in the 
hospital. In the first theoretical example, the company that owns the mine can set low wages due 
to the fact that it faces no competition in hiring workers as the only employer in the mining town, 
and since there are geographical obstacles preventing workers from seeking employment 
elsewhere. 
Other critics of capitalism had denounced employers’ treatment of their workers before 
Robinson’s book, arguing that firm owners could keep wages below the value of their labor, at the 
minimum they needed to keep working. Robinson provided a more detailed formulation of this 
issue, pointing out that, if employers actually pay workers only enough to avoid starvation, they 
will be able to sell their labor to other employers at a higher wage, in a competitive labor market. 
Yet, if labor markets are not competitive, the outcome for workers is similar to those identified by 
 
3 There is a literary support for such characterization. The most famous may be How Green Was My Valley, a 1939 
novel by Richard Llewellyn that was made into a film by John Ford in 1941. The book tells the story of a family in a 
Welsh coal mining town. 
17 
 
other economists: the unemployment is above the optimal level, and domination of the workers by 
employers results in poor working conditions and a permanent gap between wages and workers’ 
productivity. It is possible that some elements of feudalism preserved through the last centuries, 
helping employers to gain and maintain monopsony power, an issue that retarded the development 
of appropriate legal responses. 
The main sources of monopsony power can be identified through the more familiar analysis 
of the product market, which can be considered as the mirror image of the labor market, as in the 
first case the market power is exercised by the seller of goods, while in the second case by the 
buyer of labor. In product markets there are three major barriers to competition: market 
concentration refers to the case where there is only one or a few sellers, discouraging new entrants 
who have to face high fixed costs and hardly benefit from returns to scale or network effects; 
product differentiation makes comparison between different products more difficult, hence it 
reduces competition; search frictions do not help consumers in comparing products and finding the 
best offer. Although this last source of market power does not play a central role in the analysis of 
product markets, in the literature of labor markets, by contrast, the problem of search frictions has 
been further analyzed. If an employer is aware that a worker’s search cost (in monetary terms or in 
terms of time and effort) to look for a new job offer outside is high, the employer can reduce 
compensation wages and benefits despite the worker’s contributions, as it is already known that 
the worker will find it hard to look for an alternative opportunity. The labor market correlate to 
product differentiation could be firm-specific amenities of a workplace, which I will elaborate on 
later in this paper. From the point of view of an employee, it will be more difficult to compare 
firms when they offer amenities, such as a coffee bar, or a gym, that workers happen to like. Other 
amenities might rise more naturally: for example, the location of an employer might appeal to 
workers because of the convenience for commuting or the attraction of nearby restaurants or other 
businesses. Therefore, we can conclude that recent research made it clear that both product markets 
and labor markets are vulnerable to market power, and for the same reasons. 
The social cost of monopsony is analogous to the harms caused by product markets 
monopoly: a monopolist is not a price-taker, it can raise the price of goods it produces at the cost 
of some lost demand, to increase total profits. Raising the price obviously results in lower sales, 
but the earnings for each unit of goods sold is higher. The monopolist will eventually set the price 
at a specific level where the value of the lost sales from increasing the price further is exactly equal 
to the additional profit given by the units of goods sold at the increased price. The difference 
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between the monopoly price and the firm’s cost (or the competitive price) is the mark-up, which is 
a measure for market power. A similar situation can be analyzed in the labor market, in the case of 
a monopsony. A monopsonist faces the analogous trade-off when considering the fact that to hire 
an additional worker, it will have to increase wages for all its already existing workers, which 
implies an increase in its total labor costs. At the same time, if the employer decides to lower wages, 
it will lose some workers, but it will gain some profit due to a reduction in overall labor costs. As 
in the monopoly case, the monopsonist will choose a wage floor below the marginal revenue 
product. It must be noted that, just as with firms with market power, an employer with labor market 
power may not face the extreme situation of a monopsony, but as long as it will not lose its entire 




marginal revenue product (MRP) equates the marginal cost MC, at point A. This condition can be 
expressed analytically as follows:  
 𝜋(𝐿) = 𝑟(𝐿) − 𝑤(𝐿) ∙ 𝐿 (1) 
Where π(L) represents the firm’s profit, r(L) the total revenues, and w(L)∙L is the total cost of labor. 
The firm wants to choose the level of employment in order to maximize its profit, so the first-order 
condition of equation (1), π’(L)=0, implies the following: 
 𝑟′(𝐿) = 𝑤 ′(𝐿) ∙ 𝐿 + 𝑤(𝐿) (2) 
The left-hand side is the marginal revenue product of labor (represented by the red MRP curve in 
the graph), while the right-hand side is the marginal cost of labor (the green MC curve). 
The wage paid by the firm is then determined on the labor supply curve, at point M, and is 
equal to w. By contrast, in a competitive labor market, a new employer could enter the market and 
offer a wage higher than that at M by an infinitesimal amount. This would lead all the employees 
to prefer to work for the new competitor5. Repeating this mechanism, a competitive labor market 
would be forced to reach equilibrium at point C, where labor supply S equals demand, resulting in 
employment level L’ and wage rate w’. This implies that the employer with monopsony power will 
maximize profits by hiring fewer workers than the otherwise equivalent employer in a competitive 
labor market, and thus paying lower wages. 
 
5 The competitor would gain all the former profits of the first employer, minus a less-than-offsetting amount from 
the wage increase of the first employer's employees, plus profit arising from additional employees who decided to 




most common way to resolve the market failure of monopsony is through a binding minimum 
wage, often proposed as an antidote to labor market power. Most EU Member States have a 
statutory national minimum wage in place, although its level, adjustment mechanisms and coverage 
vary. 
Note that the waste created by monopsony depends crucially on the inability of firms to pay 
different wages to different workers: if an employer can pay one worker a bit more than the 
worker’s outside option, then then it could employ every worker whose marginal product revenue 
exceeds the wage. The problem is that employers’ information about employees’ outside options 
is not sufficient to practice wage discrimination very effectively. It is possible to identify other 
different negative effects produced by monopsony power, since when workers must choose 
between two employers, they may accept to work for the employer who offers a higher wage, even 
though this does not necessarily imply they are actually more productive in that position. This issue 
raises when the degree of monopsony power differs across employers, thus one of them may offer 
higher wages because of its limited market power, leading to misemployment. 
 
1.2. The impact of the introduction of a minimum wage in a monopsonistic labor 
market 
 
What happens if a minimum wage is introduced in this labor market, either directly by the 
government or through collective bargaining laws? According to the model of perfectly 
competitive labor market, it is clear how a minimum wage floor reduces employment and, as any 
other type of market intervention, leads to inefficiency. But some studies have shown that in the 
presence of monopsony power, the introduction of a minimum wage does not inevitably cost jobs: 





introduction of a statutory minimum wage is a win-win policy which could increase employment 
and wages at the same time. 
However, it is not true that any intervention from the government in this market would 
increase employment. If, for example, a too high minimum wage floor is set, the intersection 
between MC’ and MRP could result in a level of employment which is lower than the case of no 
intervention in the monopsonistic labor market (L). Imagine a horizontal black line that crosses 
MRP above the point of intersection between MRP and the original MC (green line). In this case it 
is commonly said that the government overshoots and the welfare losses are larger than in the case 
of no intervention. 
 
1.3. Empirical estimates of non-infinite wage elasticity of the labor supply curve to an 
individual firm 
 
During the 20th century, the labor literature largely focused on the pure monopsony model, 
giving little importance to the fact that the imposition of a minimum wage could increase 
employment and wage rates at the same time: this possibility has been generally regarded as 
empirically unimportant, due to the rarity of cases of monopsony in labor markets. Relatively little 
attention has been paid to the more general case of imperfect competition, where several competing 
firms exercise wage-setting power. Knowing the degree of firms’ monopsony power is important 
to explain several empirical puzzles that have profound implications for how labor market policies 
affect workers and employers. From the regulatory perspective, it is important to identify 
conditions under which firms possess a high degree of wage-setting power, thus making workers 
especially vulnerable. For this reason, the question of how individuals and firms adapt their 
behavior in response to policy changes is now one of the most investigated topics in empirical labor 
economics. Many studies have been conducted over the past 15-20 years since Boal and Ransom 
(1997) and Manning (2003), including those with high quality research designs, showing that, 
although not monopsony in the strictest sense, monopsony power can be exercised by any employer 
that faces an upward sloping supply curve for labor, resulting in lower wages. Firms have some 
wage-setting power, even in the presence of many competitors, due to search frictions or high levels 
of differentiation. As previously mentioned, the classical economic literature relying on the 
perfectly competitive model suggests that if employers cut wage rates, workers should immediately 
cut their labor supply, or leave their current job to pursue better options outside. As appealing as it 
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is in its simplicity, this argument does not consider many important variables that could inhibit the 
workers from reacting that way, such as non-compete agreements, geographic isolation, moving 
costs, or simply the fact that workers may prefer their employer for non-monetary reasons. In a 
more realistic labor market, workers may be reluctant to look for different options and firms possess 
monopsony power, the extent of which depends on the elasticity of labor supply that the firm faces. 
The first-order condition of the profit maximization problem for a firm that faces an 
upward-sloping labor supply curve yields a solution that links the wage paid by the firm, the 
marginal revenue product of labor and the elasticity of labor supply in the following way: 
 𝑤 = 𝑟′(𝐿) 𝜀𝑁1 + 𝜀𝑁 (1) 
Where r’(L) is the marginal revenue product of labor and 𝜀𝑁 is the elasticity of labor supply to an 
individual firm with respect to the wage, 𝜀𝑁 ≡ 𝜕𝐿𝜕𝑤 𝑤𝐿 . If supply is perfectly elastic (𝜀𝑁 = ∞), then 
the additional worker is paid exactly the incremental value they supply to the firm: 𝑤 = 𝑟′(𝐿). 
While, if the elasticity is a high finite number, for example, if 𝜀𝑁 = 9, the worker is paid 90% of 
her worth to the firm. The lower the elasticity, the less the worker is paid: when 𝜀𝑁 = 1, the wage 
is 50% of the worker’s worth.  
According to the research conducted in the article Monopsony in labor markets: a review 
(Manning, 2020), the most direct way to assess the importance of monopsony is indeed to estimate 
directly the wage elasticity of the labor supply curve to individual firms. The effectiveness of labor 
market reforms crucially depends on the workers’ labor supply responses to wage changes. Yet, 
the findings reported by different strands of empirical literature on monopsony remain very diverse 
as studies document substantially different empirical estimates, even for the same country and time 
period. The first part of the paper discusses the work that has been done to model the monopsony 
power of employers according to two different methods: ‘modern’ monopsony based on search 
frictions in the labor market and ‘new classical’ monopsony based on thin labor markets deriving 
from idiosyncratic tastes among workers. The second part of the paper discusses the areas where 
the monopsony perspective has proved or could prove useful in understanding labor market issues, 
such as wage inequality and the labor share of national income. Although anti-trust laws have been 
applied to limit market power in labor markets, as well as in product markets, competition policy 




1.3.1. Modern Monopsony 
 
Manning (2003) provides a turnover-based approach. According to modern monopsony, 
the main source of market power derives from the fact that it takes time for workers to find a new 
job, therefore they bear a cost, pecuniary or non-pecuniary. The basic assumption is that the firm’s 
employment represents an equilibrium between the flow of workers who leave and those who join 
the firm. These flows are determined by the wage that the firm chooses (w), and other 
characteristics x (including the wages offered by other firms). The size in terms of employment 
N(w,x) in a steady-state can be written as: 
 𝑁(𝑤, 𝑥) = 𝑅(𝑤, 𝑥) 𝑞(𝑤, 𝑥)⁄  (1) 
Where R(w,x) is the flow of recruits to the firm and q(w,x) is the quit rate, both assumed to be 
influenced by the offered wage and the factor x. In elasticity terms, the labor supply function in 
equation (1) can be written as the elasticity of the recruitment function minus the elasticity of the 
quit function, as follows: 
 𝜀𝑁 = 𝜀𝑅 − 𝜀𝑞 (2) 𝜀𝑅 is the elasticity of new recruitments, and 𝜀𝑞 is the elasticity of quit rate. Therefore, equation (2) 
states that the elasticity of the labor supply to the wage can be inferred from empirical observations 
on the sensitivity to the wage of worker inflows (recruitment activity) and worker outflows 
(separations). To simplify things even more, Manning (2003) suggested that in a steady-state, the 
recruitment elasticity should, on average, be equal to minus the separation elasticity because, for 
job-to-job moves, one firm’s quit is another firm’s recruit (𝜀𝑞 = −𝜀𝑅). As it is rare for a researcher 
to find reliable data to estimate both 𝜀𝑅 and 𝜀𝑞, it is possible to infer 𝜀𝑁 in the following ways: 
 
𝜀𝑁 = −2𝜀𝑞 𝜀𝑁 = 2𝜀𝑅 (3) 
Very few papers concentrate their effort in the estimate of 𝜀𝑅, as this operation requires 
information on both the workers employed and the number of qualified applicants a position 
received. Estimates of 𝜀𝑞 are much more common, as they only require the use of payroll data, 
which contain information on the length of an employee’s tenure at a firm and on their wage at the 
same time: the covariance between these two variables identifies the quit rate elasticity. It is 
commonly agreed that there is an inverse relationship between wages and the quit rates; indeed, 
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there is a long literature in economics that examines this question9. According to Burdett and 
Mortensen (1998), workers randomly search employers for a job that pays a higher wage while 
they are employed and an acceptable wage when unemployed, whereas each employer posts a wage 
conditional on the search behavior of workers and the wage offered by other firms. The higher the 
rate offered by one employer the larger the labor supply to that specific firm, as more workers are 
attracted to the firm that offers a higher wage than competitors. However, if employed workers do 
not receive job offers but unemployed workers face a positive but finite arrival rate of offers, all 
employers will offer the monopsony wage, obtaining the monopsony equilibrium. Wage dispersion 
exists in equilibrium even when workers are equally productive in all jobs. Three predictions follow 
from this simplest version of the model. First, workers with more experience have more 
possibilities to be found in higher paying jobs. Then, there is a positive relationship between the 
labor force size and the wage paid, and finally, there is a negative relationship between wage offers 
and quit rates across employers. 
Sokolova and Sorensen (2020) employ Google Scholar to search for papers related to 
monopsony and papers that estimate parameters of monopsony power. They analyze 1320 
estimates of the labor supply elasticity to the firm reported in 53 different studies published 
between 1977 and 2019. Exploring how supply elasticity estimates vary according to relevant 
economic and institutional factor used by researchers and using meta-regressions to examine these 
and other sources of variation, they try to provide the average elasticity of the labor supply. 
Through this measure, it is possible to see how far, on average, labor markets deviate from the 
perfectly competitive behavior. Many papers estimate effects that can, through linear 
transformations, be converted to measures of the supply elasticity (e.g. studies that estimate 𝜀𝑁 
with a direct regression of the number of workers employed at a given firm on the wage paid to 
those workers, or studies that report 𝜀𝑞 or 𝜀𝑅). These ‘direct’ estimates comprise 1140 estimates 
out of the total sample, while the remaining 180 estimates come from studies computing the inverse 
elasticity of labor supply. Out of the 1140 ‘direct’ estimates, about 870 estimates are derived from 
studies that use quit rates elasticities, and typically come up with numbers that imply labor supply 
elasticity around 2. The remaining (approximately 270) estimates are derived from studies that use 
recruitments elasticity or some type of structural estimation, and they come up with a result slightly 
higher than 2. These estimates are all quite small, suggesting significant levels of market power for 
employers. 
 
9 See, for example, Pencavel (1972) and Parsons (1972). 
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1.3.2. New Classical Monopsony 
 
Alongside the research on modern monopsony, rooted in search frictions, there has been a 
revival in the interest in new classical monopsony models, which consider idiosyncratic tastes 
among workers to be the reason why the labor supply curve to an individual firm is not perfectly 
elastic. Card, Cardoso, Heining and Kline (2018) provide a microeconomic foundation for 
imperfect labor market competition by allowing workers to have idiosyncratic preferences over the 
work environments of different potential employers. Rather than build a model of the supply side 
based on search frictions, they follow the industrial organization literature, working with a model 
that focuses on heterogeneity across workers in their valuation of jobs. The working conditions can 
reflect differences in the length of commute, firm location, corporate cultures, or other factors that 
are not fully priced into wages. Idiosyncrasy makes employers imperfect substitutes in the eyes of 
workers, endowing firms with some wage-setting power as in classical monopsony models. Even 
without search frictions, this model implies that labor is supplied inelastically to firms. 
The utility of a worker i from working in a firm f is given by: 
 𝑢𝑖𝑓 = 1𝜀 [𝑤𝑓 − ?̃?𝑓] + 𝜃𝑖𝑓 (1) 
Where ?̃?𝑓 is a measure of how attractive it is to work in firm f for all workers and 𝜃𝑖𝑓 is the 
idiosyncratic factor. Denoting the total labor supply as L10, the number of workers employed in 
firm f is computed through the multinomial logit form: 
 𝑁𝑓 = 𝑒(1𝜀[𝑤𝑓−?̃?𝑓])∑ 𝑒(1𝜀[𝑤𝑓′−?̃?𝑓′])𝑓′ 𝐿 (2) 
The denominator represents the wages and amenities offered by all firms in the market. Equation 
(2) can be rewritten taking a log linear approximation, as follows: 
 𝑛𝑓 = 1𝜀 [𝑤𝑓 − 𝑏𝑓] (3) 𝑛𝑓 and 𝑤𝑓 are respectively the log employment and the log wage, while the term 𝑏𝑓 is a labor 
supply shifter that can be expressed in the following way: 
 




 𝑏𝑓 = ?̃?𝑓 + 𝜀𝑙 − ∑ 𝑠𝑓′[𝑤𝑓′ −𝑓′ ?̃?𝑓′] (4) 
Where 𝑠𝑓′  represents the market share of each firm, or, in other words, the probability of working 
for each firm. The labor supply shifter is a function of the amenities offered by firm f, the total 
labor supply, and the wage rates and amenities offered by the other firms in the market, weighted 
by the probability of working for those firms. If worker i consider one employer in the market a 
close substitute for employer f, the first one will receive a high weight. 
From the log linear approximation in equation (3), it is possible to derive the wage elasticity 
of the labor supply curve to an individual firm: 
 
1𝜀𝑓 = 1 − 𝑠𝑓𝜀  (5) 
With 𝑠𝑓 being the market share of firm f and 𝜀 the inverse of the labor supply elasticity facing the 
firm. When 𝜀 = 0, it is the case of a perfectly competitive labor market, while a higher value 
implies the employer has more monopsony power. If firms are small related to the total size of the 
market, the market share of firm f can be approximated to zero (𝑠𝑓 ≈ 0), implying that firms with 
higher market share are likely to have more wage-setting power. 
Azar, Berry and Marinescu (2019) estimate the wage impact on workers’ choice among 
differentiated jobs in the largest occupations. They use an online job posting and applications 
dataset from CareerBuilder.com to estimate a model of demand for jobs that differ in terms of 
geographic location, as well as job characteristics that are known to market participants. The 
authors find the firm-level labor supply elasticity is about 5.8, higher than found in many other 
applications, implying that workers are paid only around 85% of their worth to the firm, but 
consistent with employers having a non-trivial amount of monopsony power even for the largest 
occupational labor markets. 
While the ability of firms to set wages is disciplined by market competition, this article 
provides evidence that there are clearly limits to those competitive forces. Modern monopsony is 
based on the idea that workers bear some costs to find and start a new job, but even without search 
frictions, firms will be able to set wages if workers differ in their valuation of firms’ nonwage 
characteristics. New classical monopsony considers heterogeneity in tastes among different 
workers to be the explanation for labor being supplied inelastically to firms, providing some scope 
to set wages. Both approaches are likely to contain some elements of truth, but the new classical 
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view assumes that workers have the possibility to choose between all the firms existing in the 
market, which is exactly what modern monopsony considers rare due to search frictions. It is 
possible to combine these two different approaches rewriting the equation in the multinomial logit 
form (2) with the assumption that workers have a smaller choice set than the whole set of firms in 
the market. The number of these firms decreases when search frictions are higher. 
1.3.3. Applications of Monopsony 
 
The second part of the paper tries to show how monopsony can be useful in understanding 
a wider range of labor market phenomena, besides the introduction of a minimum wage. Some are 
well-established (e.g. the gender pays gap) while others are emerging (e.g. immigration, wage 
inequality, and the labor share) and monopsony has the potential to improve our knowledge of 
labor markets. 
I. Debates about the introduction of a binding minimum wage has been the main area where 
the monopsonistic model had a wider impact for a long time, though it remains a 
contentious issue in many countries. The balance of opinion among both researchers and 
policymaker has probably shifted recently to a more positive view of setting a minimum 
wage at an appropriate level. One fundamental question is how high minimum wages can 
be pushed, as monopsony predicts that there is a limit to the level at which the wage rates 
can be set without having a negative effect on employment, but the existing literature does 
not help in finding the adequate level which maximizes employment. It is plausible that 
firms have more monopsony power in some labor markets than others, suggesting that 
minimum wage has a more positive impact in less competitive labor markets as monopsony 
would predict. 
II. Anti-trust is one of the areas where monopsony has attracted more interest recently. Naidu, 
Posner and Weyl (2018) investigate how there have been an historical imbalance between 
product market and labor market anti-trust laws. The labor market practices which are 
attracting more interest recently regards no-poaching agreements among employers, the use 
of non-competes both directly and indirectly through franchises, and the level of labor 
market concentration among employers in local markets and how that might be affected by 
mergers. 
III. One under-explored application of monopsony is to the economics of immigration. Most 
frameworks try to analyze the impact of immigration through a perfectly competitive model 
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where all workers are paid their marginal product. Under perfect competition, it makes no 
difference for an individual employer to hire migrants or not, as the labor supply elasticity 
is infinite. In reality, many employers do care about having access to migrants, and a 
number of reasons suggests that the migrant labor market might be considered more 
monopsonistic than the native one. Immigrants have lower reservation wages than existing 
residents, which allow employers to lower their labor cost in less competitive labor markets, 
where the wage-setting power is higher and the rates are more likely to be linked to 
reservation wages rather than to productivity. Hirsch and Jahn (2015) present evidence for 
Germany that the wage elasticity for migrants is lower than for natives. Amior and Manning 
(2020) show that in the US labor market, more migrants could be associated with more 
monopsony power. These recent studies confirm that the interaction between immigration 
and monopsony is an area that deserves more consideration. 
IV. Another important reason for the current revival in interest in monopsony is a rise in wage 
inequality, the fall in the labor share and a shift in the balance of power between workers 
and employers to the advantage of business. Robinson (1933) paid attention on the gender 
pay gap and Manning (2011) reported several studies that found a lower level of quit rates 
elasticity for women than that for men, implying that employers have more wage-setting 
power on women. 
 
1.4. Monopsony and the Wage Effects of Migration 
 
The literature that has traditionally studied the impact of migration on native wages, has 
concentrated on competitive labor markets, where wages are equal to the marginal products of 
labor. In such a scenario, under the sole assumption of constant returns to scale, Borjas (1995) 
proved the “immigration surplus”, which assesses that the marginal products of native-owned 
factors must always increase (on average, in a closed economy) when the supply of migrants is 
larger (keeping their skill mix constant). And, if capital is supplied elastically, this surplus passes 
entirely to native labor in the long run, increasing the average native wage. This does not mean that 
the marginal products of all native workers will increase, however this result holds for any number 
of labor types, any number of goods, and any form of technology, as long as the empirical model 
imposes constant returns and perfect competition. 
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Amior and Manning (2020) studied the impact of immigration in the absence of perfect 
competition: in a monopsonistic labor market, wages will also depend on any mark-downs applied 
by firms and, if immigration affect these mark-downs, it will have an impact on native wages too. 
In particular, it has been proved that migrants supply labor to firms less elastically than natives (or 
migrants’ reservation wages are lower) due to a number of reasons. First, language barriers or visa-
related restrictions on labor mobility implies that migrants may be less efficient in job search. 
Second, migrants may intend to work in the host country only for a limited period, which leads 
them to discount theirs time more heavily. Third, migrants may face more restricted access to out-
of-work benefits. Finally, migrants may base their reference points on their country of origin. These 
intuitions are empirically consistent and confirm that migrants do indeed supply labor less 
elastically than natives. Their reservation wages are also sensitive to exchange rate fluctuations. 
Directly testing the claim that monopsony power depends on the migrant share, Amior and 
Manning reject the null hypothesis that native and migrant mark-downs are equal and independent 
of the migrant share. Their estimates suggest that an increase by 1% in the share of migrants allows 
firms to mark down native wages by 0.5-0.6% more. This effect more than offsets the positive 
effect of the immigration surplus which increases marginal products, leading to lower mean native 
wages overall, even in the long run. However, it is important to note that such negative effects on 
mark-downs may be offset through policies which constrain monopsony power, such as minimum 
wages, rather than by restricting migration itself. If policy interventions can make the labor market 
more competitive (by limiting the power of firms to set mark-downs), immigration would only 
have the surplus-raising effect. 
 
1.5. Antitrust laws in Labor Markets 
 
In their paper Antitrust Remedies for Labor Market Power, Naidu, Posner, and Weyl (2018) 
propose methods to evaluate labor market power in antitrust contexts, as they claim that the 
government is usually unsuccessful in preventing firms from restricting competition in labor 
markets. The reason is that analytic methods for evaluating labor market power are far less 
sophisticated than the regulations used to judge product market power. In recent years, a declining 
economic growth rate and rising income inequality are at the center of many economics debate, 
leading to develop research that show how labor market power has contributed to wage inequality 
and economic stagnation. The ability of employers to set wages below workers’ marginal revenue 
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product is one of the causes that received increasing attention from economists. Recent evidence 
is supporting the idea that in many countries, employers possess considerable market power which 
allows them to suppress wages, increasing inequality between the income of people who work in 
concentrated and competitive labor markets. Low-income workers are the most affected, as they 
have the least bargaining power. The fact that employers set wages below the potential optimal 
level has consequences on economic growth since it results in underemployment of labor: qualified 
workers will not accept to receive wages artificially suppressed, and workers may underinvest in 
schooling and skills. This in turn costs the government both in lost taxes and in greater 
expenditures. Naidu, Posner, and Weyl estimate monopsony power in the U.S. economy reduces 
overall output and employment by 13%. 
We can think of labor market power as the mirror image of product market power, as in the 
first case it is exercised by the buyer (of labor) rather than by the seller (of goods) in the second 
case. When there is a small number of sellers or, in the extreme case, one seller in the product 
market, they have the power to charge a price higher than the marginal cost, or the price that would 
exist in a competitive market. In both cases (product or labor market), one major source of market 
power is concentration. The authors of the paper report the example of a small town where operates 
only a few gas stations, setting the price of gas to compete with the prices of other gas stations. If 
one station lowers the price of its gas, it will gain market share, which increase its profits, but will 
lose profit in sales revenues. The few gas stations could also illegally enter a cartel in which they 
charge an above-market price and divide the profits, or they might informally coordinate, leading 
to the same social harm in a more legal way. This situation would not happen in the case where a 
large number of gas stations operates, competing between each other in setting the level of the price 
of gas, resulting in the efficient level, or the marginal cost. This outcome produces a higher 
aggregate output of gasoline and reduces prices for consumers. 
Labor market concentration creates monopsony, where labor market power is exercised by 
the employers who are buying labor from employees. When there is only one or a few employers 
hiring from a pool of workers, then the labor market is concentrated, and the employers have market 
power. They will therefore set wages below the level at which workers would be paid in a 
competitive labor market (their marginal revenue) in order to minimize labor costs, this will 
discourage qualified workers to accept working there, but the employers gain more from cutting 
wages than they lose as a result of being able to hire fewer workers. 
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The authors want to emphasize that product market concentration has historically received 
a much bigger attention by researchers and governments, while labor market concentration has 
received hardly any attention at all. Although there is no distinction between seller and buyer power 
in evaluating the effects of mergers in the market, antitrust laws are not sufficiently developed to 
prevent the possible adverse labor market effects of mergers. There are several reported cases 
concerning firms that have illegally cartelized product markets, while there are relatively few cases 
involving allegations of illegally cartelized labor markets, and almost all those cases regard 
specialized settings such as sport leagues, which restrict the hiring of players. However, 
concentration is not the only source of market power, as previously discussed in this paper, search 
frictions is another important element in this issue. If antitrust keeps focusing almost exclusively 
on product market power, all these sources of market power could lead to social inefficiency and 
the economic surplus is transferred from employees to firm owners. 
Even though the dangers to public welfare posed by product and labor market power are of 
the same entity from an economic standpoint, there is an historical imbalance in the importance 
given to labor market antitrust in the economic theory. The authors suggest four different 
possibilities that could explain this issue. In the first place, legal theory has placed more emphasis 
on product markets because consumers are primarily harmed by price increases caused by product 
market power, and, as workers are consumers too, they benefited from the law’s attention to 
product markets, even though they would have benefited more if the law had paid attention to labor 
market as well. Second, it has been naturally assumed by researchers that labor markets are 
competitive, giving little attention to labor market power as a social problem. Workers who live in 
urban areas can choose between several different employers, and they have also the possibility to 
move around the country (and the world nowadays) if they are not satisfied with the job offers or 
the pay is low where they live. Only recently, many of these assumptions have been thrown into 
doubt. Third, labor law and employment law have always seemed sufficient to protect workers in 
a legal sense. Workers have historically used collective bargaining and the threat of strikes to 
prevent employers from paying them monopsony wages, while employment law countered labor 
market power by preventing employers from granting workers’ wages and benefits below an 
established artificial floor. However, both types of legal protection have eroded over the years, due 
to deregulation, foreign competition, and a chilly legal environment, accompanied by inflation, 
which eroded federal minimum wages. Fourth, antitrust litigation against employers is more 
difficult than antitrust litigation based on product market concentration, perhaps giving the illusion 
that the latter problem is more significant than the former. Class action brought by workers have 
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less chances of success than class action by consumers, because workers, unlike consumers, are 
frequently in diverse positions, defeating the common interest requirement: some workers are 
senior, others are junior, qualifications vary, contract terms vary, and so on. In the case of 
consumers, the argument is much simpler, as they claim that the price paid is higher than what it 
should be, which means they share a common interest as required by courts. And because 
successful antitrust actions by workers have been so rare, there is little developed law on the topic, 
which discourage employees and renders further litigation risky. 
The consensus that labor markets are competitive is recently collapsing in response to many 
investigations conducted by economists, such as Card and Krueger, who found evidence of 
monopsony in their analysis of the insignificant employment effects of a minimum wage hike in 
New Jersey in 1992. Several other studies of minimum wage increase in other jurisdictions and at 
other times produced similar result: even if employers raise wages, employment is not affected as 
the previous economic theory predicted. The most direct explanation for this phenomenon could 
be that labor markets are actually concentrated, and employers do pay workers less than their 
marginal product, which give importance to the monopsony theory. 
In their article, the authors suggest that the danger that mergers may lead to labor market 
power as well as product market power should be taken more seriously, providing a more detailed 
legal framework, comparable to that already existing for product market power, for evaluating the 
effects of a merger on labor markets. 
 
1.6. Expenditures on recruitment activity have an impact on the supply of labor to an 
individual firm 
 
In the article A generalized model of Monopsony (Manning, 2006) the authors assume a 
critical view of both perfect competition and monopsony, arguing that, if the first model is extreme 
in assuming that a wage cut of one cent leads all the workers employed to quit instantaneously to 
look for a new opportunity outside, the assumption of the monopsony model implying that a firm 
can only grow in employment size raising the wage rate (and moving along an upward-sloping 
labor supply curve) seems implausible. In reality, employers have the possibility of increasing the 
flow of recruits also spending more resources. This article presents a more realistic model where 
the supply of labor to an individual employer is influenced by the wage rate and expenditure on 
recruitment activity. Starting from the assumption that the wage elasticity of the labor supply to an 
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individual firm is finite, diseconomies of scale in recruitment for a given wage becomes the new 
discriminant to assess whether a labor market is better approximated by the perfectly competitive 
model or by monopsony. In this way, perfect competition is not considered anymore as a situation 
where the wage elasticity of the labor supply curve to an individual firm is infinite (which goes 
against both common sense and empirical evidence), but as one in which the marginal cost of 
recruiting a worker is independent of the level of employment. Monopsony, on the other hand, 
identifies the situation in which the marginal cost of maintaining a given stock of workers is 
increasing in employment. This model is considered as a generalized model of monopsony. 
In the static model presented in this article, the labor cost function, denoted by C(w,N), is 
defined as the cost per worker of maintaining employment size at level N, when the wage rate is 
w. The costs of recruiting a worker also include the training costs which are denoted by H(w), while 
the separation rate is s(w). In order to keep employment at N, a flow of sN recruits is needed, 
resulting in a labor cost function which is independent of employment: 𝐶(𝑤, 𝑁) = 𝐻(𝑤)𝑠(𝑤). 
But, if it becomes increasingly hard to recruit and train workers, the recruiting and training costs 
H(R,w) are function of the flow of recruits 𝑅 = 𝑠𝑁, and it follows that the labor cost function will 
be of the form 𝐶(𝑤, 𝑁) = 𝐻[𝑠(𝑤)𝑁, 𝑤]𝑠(𝑤). 
Considering the case with no training or recruitment costs, in the perfectly competitive 
model the wage is wc and the labor cost function can be written as follows: 
 
𝐶(𝑤, 𝑁) = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑤 ≥ 𝑤 𝑐 𝐶(𝑤, 𝑁) = ∞ 𝑖𝑓 𝑤 < 𝑤 𝑐  (1) 
Meaning that any amount of labor can be recruited at zero cost if the wage rate is at or above the 
competitive level, but it is impossible to recruit labor if the wage offered is below the competitive 
level. 
The form of the labor cost function in the case of monopsony is: 
 
𝐶(𝑤, 𝑁) = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑁 ≤ 𝑁 𝑠(𝑤) 𝐶(𝑤, 𝑁) = ∞ 𝑖𝑓 𝑤 > 𝑁 𝑠(𝑤) (2) 
Which says that if a firm paying a wage w wants to employ less workers than the labor supply 
forthcoming at that rate, Ns(w), it has zero recruitment costs, but there is no possibility to attract a 
higher level of labor. 
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Both cases consider an unrealistic situation and are non-differentiable: in the case of perfect 
competition any wage cut results in the impossibility to recruit new workers, while under 
monopsony the only thing the employer can do to attract new workers is to raise the wage. The 
more reasonable generalized model of monopsony assumes the separation rate to be continuous in 
the wage, which is a feature of dynamic monopsony models. 
The steady-state profits of a firm with a revenue function denoted by F(N) can be written 
as: 
 𝜋 = 𝐹(𝑁) − [𝑤 + 𝐶(𝑤, 𝑁)]𝑁 (3) 
The firm has a choice of the wage it can pay if it wants to maintain employment at N. It will 
obviously choose w to minimize direct and indirect labor costs. 
 𝜔(𝑁) = min𝑤𝑤 + 𝐶(𝑤, 𝑁) (4) 𝜔(𝑁) represents the relevant labor supply curve, or effective labor supply curve, which can replace 
w(N) in the decision problem for the employer, as follows: 
 𝜋 = 𝐹(𝑁) − 𝜔(𝑁)𝑁 (5) 
Assuming that the labor cost function is differentiable, and the second derivative is positive, 
equation (4) has the following first-order condition: 
 −1 − 𝐶𝑤(𝑤, 𝑁) = 0 (6) 
If the labor cost function is increasing in employment, the effective labor supply curve facing the 
firm is upward-sloping, while, if the labor cost function is independent of employment, then the 
effective labor supply curve will be infinitely elastic and will be the case of perfect competition. It 
is important to note that this result is obtainable even if the wage elasticity of labor supply to the 
firm is not infinite, so that the labor market would initially appear monopsonistic. The slope of 𝜔(𝑁) is important to understand the impact of the minimum wage in the case of perfect competition 
and monopsony. 
Considering the employment decision, the profit maximization problem of the employer 
implies what follows: 
 𝐹′(𝑁) = 𝜔(𝑁) + 𝜔′(𝑁)𝑁 (7) 
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The firm will choose that level of employment which equalize the marginal product of labor to the 
marginal cost of the effective labor supply curve. 
When a binding minimum wage is imposed on a firm, in the standard monopsony case the 
new labor supply curve becomes horizontal for the level of employment where the firm would 
otherwise pay a wage below wmin. In this model, the relevant analysis is focused on the effects of 
wmin on the slope of the effective labor supply curve, and thus its impact on employment. Looking 
at equation (7), there are two distinct effects on the marginal cost of labor: wmin increases 𝜔(𝑁) but 
reduces 𝜔′(𝑁). The first derivative of the marginal cost of labor with respect to the minimum wage 
shows the total effect of wmin on MCL: 
 
𝜕𝑀𝐶𝐿𝜕𝑤min = 1 + 𝐶𝑤(𝑤min , 𝑁) + 𝐶𝑤𝑁(𝑤min , 𝑁)𝑁 (8) 
From equation (6) it follows that (1 + 𝐶𝑤) = 0 and the impact of the minimum wage on 
employment depends only on the sign of 𝐶𝑤𝑁. Under perfect competition the labor cost function is 
independent of employment, 𝐶𝑁 = 𝐶𝑤𝑁 = 0, hence the marginal effect on employment is zero. But 
any level of the minimum wage above the one chosen by the firm will reduce employment. 
However, in the non-competitive case, equation (8) shows that, when 𝐶𝑤𝑁 < 0, there is a negative 
effect of the minimum wage introduction on the marginal cost of labor and a positive effect on 
employment, while if 𝐶𝑤𝑁 > 0, the opposite happens. To assess whether the first or the second 
case is more plausible in reality, it is helpful to consider the relationship between the effective labor 
supply curve and the wage paid without the introduction of a binding minimum wage. By 
differentiating equation (6), it follows that: 
 sgn (𝜕𝑤𝜕𝑁) = −sgn[𝐶𝑤𝑁(𝑤, 𝑁)] (9) 
Equation (9) shows that there is an inverse relationship between the sign of 𝐶𝑤𝑁 and the sign of (𝜕𝑤𝜕𝑁). If 𝐶𝑤𝑁 < 0, the slope of the effective labor supply curve decreases and moving up the curve 
implies that the effective marginal cost of labor reduces, while the wage paid by the employer rises. 
If 𝐶𝑤𝑁 > 0, the minimum wage results in a higher slope of the effective labor supply curve, hence 
the marginal cost of labor increases, while the wage falls. The first case seems more plausible as it 
is consistent with several empirical estimates of a positive employer-seize wage effect, and a higher 
wage generally reduces expenditure on training and recruitment costs decreasing the separation 
rates. These results confirm the importance of the form of the labor cost function: the labor market 
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is considered monopsonistic when 𝐶(𝑤, 𝑁) is increasing in employment and competitive when it 




1.7. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
All the articles presented in this chapter show how it is becoming clear beyond any 
reasonable doubt that labor markets have important elements of monopsony power. The results 
obtained by the researchers provide evidence on both the elasticity of the labor supply curve and 
diseconomies of scale in expenditure for recruitment activity, implying a considerable degree of 
firms’ wage-setting power. Recently, academic research on such labor markets has made its way 
into policy debates, though there is a number of economists who believe perfect competition is a 
better model to approximate the dynamics of a labor market. The amount of monopsony power 
estimated in some studies is not negligible and offers a useful perspective in several areas of 
interventions such as the introduction of a binding minimum wage. The article Monopsony in labor 
markets: a review attempts to synthesize empirical evidence on the elasticity of the labor supply 
curve to an individual firm, a parameter that captures the extent of firms’ wage-setting power. The 
first approach presented by the authors (‘modern’ monopsony) is rooted on search frictions: it is 
implausible to assume that workers can look for different jobs outside and quit their current 
positions without bearing any cost, pecuniary or non-pecuniary. The second approach focuses on 
idiosyncratic tastes among workers for the amenities offered that are not fully priced into wages, 
which makes employers imperfect substitutes in the eyes of a worker. These studies provide 
evidence for a non-negligible level of wage-setting power. The generalized model of monopsony 
has presented a more sensible framework, different from the canonical models that are typically 
used in the literature which are very stylized and easy to criticize. Those who are critical of 
monopsony point out the implausibility of assuming that the only way an employer can increase 
employment size is to raise the offered wage and move along an upward-sloping labor supply 
curve. Starting from the assumption that the wage elasticity of the labor supply to an individual 
employer is finite, the variable considered to assess whether labor markets are best thought of as 
‘competitive’ or ‘monopsonistic’ are diseconomies of scale in recruitment. If the labor cost function 
is independent of employment, hence if there are no diseconomies of scale in recruitment activity, 
what would appear at first sight a monopsonistic labor market, in this model is characterized by an 
infinitely elastic effective labor supply curve and falls within the case of a perfect competitive 
market. Imperfect competition among employers can lead to workers being paid less than their 
worth to the firm. Whether such welfare losses are experienced in reality is determined by the 
extent to which firms and governments exploit their monopsony power. However, the results 
obtained by these studies show how salary markdowns can be predicted assuming that employers 
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fully exploit the power they have over workers11. The idea that even highly advanced labor markets 
might be better characterized as imperfectly competitive raises questions about the welfare 
implications of labor market policies and institutions. Yet significant challenges remain. The field 
continues to rely almost exclusively on observational studies based on plausible, but ultimately 
debatable, identifying assumption. More studies are needed using research designs that can credibly 
identify the causal link from firm-specific shocks to workers’ wage. 
The article proposed by Naidu, Posner, and Weyl points out that labor market power is 
costly to society and bad for economic growth, and equality. Despite this, this issue is generally 
ignored by antitrust authorities, and never considered as a reasonable justification for further 
analyze merger effects, from the point of view of labor markets. The authors suggest applying the 
economic analysis of product markets in the scrutiny of mergers also to labor markets. 
Amior and Manning show that, under the assumption of constant returns, a larger supply of 
migrants must always increase the marginal products of natives, unless they both have identical 
skill mixes. Moreover, in the long run, this surplus is entirely passed to native labor. This result is 
questioned in the case of a monopsonistic labor market, since wages also depends an any mark-
downs imposed by the firms, that can exploit immigration imposing even larger mark-downs on 
the wages of both migrants and native, if migrants supply labor less elastically than natives (and 
there is evidence that supports this assumptions). The article then show that immigration may 
indeed reduce mean native wages overall, even in the long run, but this result does not necessarily 
mean that migration is generally harmful for native workers: if policy interventions would make 
the labor market more competitive by limiting in some way employers’ market power, immigration 
would then only have the positive effect of increasing the marginal products of native-owned 
factors on average. 
  
 
11 George Priest’s (2010) paper describes one direct evidence for monopsony power being exploited by agents: 
employers use non-wage compensations for the allocation of workers (e.g., forced matching programs). Once 







2. Empirical analysis on the effects of the national statutory minimum 
wage introduction in Germany 
 
2.1. Germany Minimum Wage reform 
 
Since the early 1990s, Germany experienced a dramatic increase in wage inequality. Most 
notably, real wages of workers in the lower part of the distribution have decreased: between 1995 
and 2015, real wages increased by nearly 20% at the 90th percentile, by 8% at the median, and 
declined by 13% at the 10th percentile.  In response, on January 1, 2015, German labor market was 
exposed to a massive intervention in its wage structure: the Minimum Wage law12 
(Mindestlohngesetz) entered into force, introducing a national statutory minimum wage at a level 
of €8.50 gross per hour. Prior to this reform, in 2013, Germany had already put in place a number 
of sector-specific minimum wages, which allowed to predict some of the potential wage floor 
effects. Until then, wage floors were set by collective, voluntary agreements within specific sectors. 
The Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs conducted an analysis on eight sectors13, which 
overall suggested no or small statistically significant negative effects on employment for most 
sectors, but small positive wage effects of the sectoral minimum wages. In January 2015, a 
Minimum Wage Commission (Mindestlohnkommission) was also established, with the aim of 
monitor and evaluate the implementation of the reform and its effects every 2 years, in order to 
provide appropriate protection to workers and ensuring fair market competition. Sectors with 
existing minimum wage floors below €8.50 were allowed to slowly adapt to the reform, granting 
them a transition period through January 2017. Permanent exemptions apply to minors, trainees 
and interns (e.g., students or apprentices completing required or elective internships of up to three 
months), volunteers and long-term unemployed (those who have been registered as such for at least 
12 months), which substantially reduce the number of eligible individuals. In light of minor short-
term employment effects, the wage floor was progressively increased to €8.84 in 2017 and to €9.35 
in 2019. The reform put in place in 2015 provides an interesting case for international research, as 
it was the first time a nationwide statutory minimum wage was implemented, with very limited 
legal exemptions. It was binding for nearly all 37 million dependent employees, unfolding a 
substantial ‘bite’: around 10% to 14% of the eligible work force earned less than €8.50 per hour in 
 
12MiLoG, https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_milog/index.html, last accessed on December 3 2020. 
13 The waste industry, the main construction trade, the roofing industry, electrician trade, facility cleaning services, 
care sector, painters and varnishers, and laundry services. 
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the previous year, meaning that around 4 million jobs were directly affected. The wage floor was 
introduced at a comparatively high level in Germany14 (see Figure 4), affecting most of the 
population, which is the reason why this reform can give insights into potential minimum wage 
effects even beyond the German context. In 2015, the ratio between the minimum and the median 
wage in Germany was 0.48, lower than the French one (with minimum wage-to-median ratio of 
0.61), but considerably higher compared to the US ratio of 0.36. The German economy was 
characterized by robust economic growth in the years surrounding the implementation of the 
reform. Between 2010 and 2016, Germany nominal GDP grew by 20%, while unemployment fell 
from 5.5% in 2011 to 3.9% in 2016, a record-low level not seen since the early 1980s. 
 
Figure 4. Hourly Minimum Wages in 2015 in Purchasing Power Parities (in Euro). Source: OECD. 
  
 
14 In 2015, it ranked among the highest wage floors in Europe when accounting for purchasing power. 
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2.2. Expectations about benefits and drawbacks of the Minimum Wage 
 
The introduction of the minimum wage was preceded by a long debate among German 
economists and policymakers about potential threats and benefits of a national wage floor. From 
one side, supporters stressed fairness, inequality reduction, and positive distributive effects, as well 
as a reduced dependence of workers on social transfers. On the other side, opponents warned of 
the possible negative effects on employment in the long run, predicting an extensive job destruction 
(especially in the low-wage segment) of 500,000 to 900,000 jobs. Furthermore, achieving the main 
target of poverty alleviation was also questioned, since expectations on positive effects were small 
due to the German in-work benefits regulations and withdrawal rates of income from 80 to 100% 
for many low-income households. As a result, households with low income would gain nothing 
more than an increase in the risk of job loss caused by a strong rise of employers’ labor costs.  
However, no or small negative short-run employment effects were expected by economists, rather, 
they suggested the reform could lead to “mini-jobs”15 being transformed into regular employment. 
This transition does not necessarily entail more net income for workers as they start to pay taxes 
and social-security contributions. In addition, as mini-jobs are usually chosen due to a limited time 
budget, extending labor supply is often not desired. In sharp contrast, employers benefit from 
transitioning workers from marginal to regular employment thanks to a decrease in total labor costs, 
even in the presence of an increasing gross wage, as employers’ marginal social security 
contributions are strongly reduced. Therefore, the decrease of marginal employment may not 
necessarily imply a rising unemployment since it could be associated with an increase in the 
demand of regular employment. In accordance with these consequences, studies on monopsonistic 
labor markets offer several possible explanations for the absence of negative employment effects 
after the introduction of a minimum wage, at odds with the huge negative employment effects that 
were predicted ex-ante. In addition, legal administrative hurdles may delay negative employment 
effects to the long term. One further explanation for such a result could be employers ignoring new 
minimum wage regulations due to insufficient control and enforcement mechanisms. Most 
contracts and paychecks in Germany do not stipulate hourly wages, rather monthly salaries and 
agreed working hours are specified, but detailed information are not always available: the 
contractual wage is set in employment contracts, while the actual wage depends on the effective 
 
15 Mini-jobs or marginal employment are a specific type of job in Germany, defined by a monthly income below 
€450, no compulsory social security contributions by employee, and are exempted from income taxation. They can 
be pursued as a primary/sole or a secondary/add-on jobs. 
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workload of each employee (a common blind spot in administrative data). The German Customs 
Administration is responsible for conducting inspections of employer firms and enforcing 
compliance with social security laws and the Minimum Wage Law. Between 2014 and 2015 there 
has been a reduction of 30% in inspections conducted by the Customs Administration. In 2015, 
prosecutors initiated legal proceedings with 1.6% of the firms inspected, and the average fine was 
about 275€. 
Table 1 summarizes the number of beneficiaries: at the time of its introduction, the 
minimum wage ranked among the highest wage floors among European countries when accounting 
for purchasing power, and combined with the limited number of legal exemptions, this high bite 
translated into a large number of affected individuals. In 2014, around 5.5 million workers earned 
less than €8.50 per hour, and 72% of this group (around 4.0 million employees) were eligible for 
the minimum wage. It must be noted that the timeline of the minimum wage introduction allows 
for potential anticipation effects, which have been neglected by some previous studies on the 
German case. Moreover, the German Federal Statistical Office estimates that some groups are 
particularly affected. It is clear form Table 1 that females and marginally employed workers are 
two of those groups. 
Table 1. Minimum wage beneficiaries in 2014 
 
Source: Destatis (2016) 
 
As the German Minimum Wage Commission pointed out in 2018, overall, there are no statistically 
significant negative short-term employment effects found for most sectors, whereas wage increases 
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are apparent, especially for East Germany. Yet, negative employment effects are also found for 
single sectors and particular time frames. With the minimum wage in place for over 6 years, the 
number of ex post impact assessments is increasing. These focus mainly on employment and 
distribution effects, but also on a large variety of other outcomes: working hours and work 
intensity, inequality and fairness, reservation wages and prices. 
 
2.3. Identification strategies 
 
A large part of the literature on minimum wage regulations has used a variety of 
identification strategies for the causal evaluation of aggregated short- and long-term impacts on 
two economic outcomes: wage inequality and employment. In order to find reliable estimates, 
researchers used three main sources of variation in treatment intensity: 
1. Identification using variation in treatment intensity over time. Such an application studies 
the effects of a given reform by exploiting inter-temporal variation in minimum wage when 
it has been adjusted over time or newly introduced. In the German case, this approach would 
compare wage growth and employment size before and after the introduction of the reform 
in 2015. Since there are many other factors that may affect the wage distribution besides 
the minimum wage, which cannot be assumed to be casual, variation over time is not an 
appropriate method to estimate the impact of the reform on employment and wage 
inequality in the German case. 
2. Identification using variation of treatment by economic sectors. One strand of economic 
literature has exploited variation in minimum wage floors across sectors and over time. This 
method has proved reliable to estimates the sector-specific minimum wages in Germany. 
Yet, the assumption that all sectors would have developed equally in the absence of the 
reform and, thus, would share a common trend, is likely violated. Therefore, this approach 
is not feasible to estimate employment effect of the national minimum wage in Germany. 
3. Identification using variation over regions. Inter-regional variation of minimum wage floors 
can be caused by legislative differences and/or by different wage structure, resulting in 
differences in the regional ‘bite’ of the minimum wage. In Germany, there is no legislative 
variation between federal states, but hourly wage distributions are relatively different across 
regions, hence there is variation in the regional ‘bite’ of the reform. This is measured by 
the regional shares of employees paid less than the minimum wage before 2015. 
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Due to the universal validity of the reform, the set of empirical identification strategies 
is considerably restricted in the German case. Following the identification approach proposed 
by Card (1992), which considers regional variation that does not depend on differences in 
legislation, it is possible to evince that the stronger that a minimum wage ‘bites’ into the 
regional wage distribution, the stronger the regional labor market is affected, and so should be 
the adaptation of labor demand. The imposition of a national wage standard implies the 
"treatment effect" varies across states depending on the fraction of workers initially earning 
less than the new minimum. Across regions, earnings and wages differences are caused by 
structural and environmental diversity. Among the 4 million workers directly affected by the 
introduction of the minimum wage (10.7% of employees according to the German Federal 
Statistical Office), some groups are disproportionally affected. Besides females and marginally 
employed, East-German residents are of particular interest. One in five East-German residents 
earned less than the new wage floor in the years before to the introduction of the reform, a 
much higher proportion compared to West Germany, where only 9% of the eligible workforce 
was affected. The ‘regional bite’ is defined as the degree to which a region is affected by the 
minimum wage and it is a crucial measure to the identification strategy. It is expressed through 
the two following variables: the Fraction and the Kaitz index (see Figure 4). The first one 
reflects the share of affected eligible employees per region, while the second one displays the 
relation of the minimum wage to the regional minimum wage. The higher this value is, the 
stronger that the minimum wage bites. Both bite measures reflect the long-lasting and 
significant structural differences between East and West Germany, as the bite is much higher 
in the eastern part. Cities and surrounding areas like Munich or Hanover, as well as highly 
industrialized areas, report a lower bite compared to different parts of Germany. The overall 
pictures look roughly the same, even though the two different measures do not always display 
the same ranking of areas by bite, due to the fact that the Kaitz index is a ratio between the 
minimum wage and the average wage, while the Fraction measures the percentage of affected 
workers. Therefore, the Kaitz index can be influenced also by movements in the upper part of 
the wage distribution. Overall, the graphical analysis suggests significant variability across 




Figure 5. Degree to which labor markets are affected in 201416. Bite measures are divided into deciles. 
  
 
16 Source: SES 2014. 
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2.4. Empirical approach: identification using regional variation 
 
The German reform is an interesting case study to analyze the degree of monopsony power 
in labor markets, also outside the German context, as the minimum wage was set at a comparatively 
high level and it was binding for all 37 million employees. In contrast to most evaluation studies 
that exploit marginal changes in the existing minimum wage laws in the United States or other 
countries, the German case study proves particularly interesting because it represents a high-
impact, binding minimum wage introduction with a large share of the population affected. The 
German reform offers a unique opportunity to more clearly establish causality and contribute to 
the broader debate in Germany and around the world. The primary goal of the reform, which set a 
wage floor of € 8.50 in all regions and economic sectors with few exceptions, was to increase gross 
hourly wages for low-wage workers. The minimum wage bit quite hard into the wage distribution, 
affecting directly around 4 million individuals who earned less than €8.50 prior to the reform (10%-
14%, depending on the data source). Economists and policymakers analyzed all the possible 
outcomes of the reform, trying to predict what could be the direct effect of the intervention in the 
labor market on employment size in Germany. Two different ways of thinking lead to opposite 
expectations on the long-term effects of the reform: from one side, those who criticize the reform, 
predict a massive reduction in jobs number, especially in the low-wage segment, which lead to a 
failure in the policy target of poverty alleviation; from the opposite side, positive distribution 
effects suggests that this reform would reduce inequality among the distribution of wages. 
These different expectations reflect the two different currents of thought described in the 
first chapter of this paper, suggesting that the introduction of the minimum wage in Germany in 
2015 is indeed an interesting case to empirically analyze the potential monopsonistic aspects of the 
labor market. Most textbook treatments of the employment effects of the minimum wage rely on 
the simple supply-demand model of price floors and the outcome is often contrasted with that 
which occurs under monopsony. The neoclassical model, represented by the perfectly competitive 
labor market, predicts a reduction in demand for the factor that becomes relatively more costly. In 
this case, employees in the low-wage segment would become more costly to employers, leading 
the critics of the introduction of the minimum wage to expect a reduction in employment size. 
However, search models, also predict a positive effect of minimum wages because of rising 
marginal costs of labor from frictions. In recent years, the analysis of the effects of a minimum 
wage in a competitive labor market has been significantly extended (Brown et al., 2014). If the 
labor market shows some aspects that suggest the presence of certain levels of monopsony power, 
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labor demand effects could also be positive when employees are paid below the marginal product 
of labor beforehand. On the supply side, models predict that individuals whose reservation wages 
lie between the minimum wage and the previous market wage now enter the labor market, causing 
an increase in involuntary unemployment. For all these reasons explained above, employment 
effects are not clear ex ante; thus, the choice of the identification method is a crucial task for the 
minimum wage evaluation. 
The aim of the analysis conducted in this paper is to give an overview of the short-term 
effects of the minimum wage introduction on employment size in Germany. Overall, the literature 
suggests small negative employment effects, while poverty is not found to be reduced. However, 
life and job satisfaction for affected individuals appear to be increased. 
As previously mentioned, to estimate causal effects of the minimum wage, literature relies 
on a variety of identification approaches. The strategy that relies on legislative variation in the 
minimum wage regulation is not feasible for the German case, as the reform applies equally in all 
regions. It is applicable, for example, in the case of the United States, where differences in state-
level minimum wages are used to evaluate diverging wage and employment trends. This approach 
is especially appealing when federal state labor markets are very similar and only differ with respect 
to their regulations and structure. There are some other identification approaches that rely on 
comparison of exempted sectors, but these groups tend to be systematically different and fail in the 
assumption that both groups would have developed equally in the absence of the reform. For this 
reason, it is not realistic to assume that the two different groups would share a common trend 
excluding the introduction of the reform. Following the analysis conducted by Card (1992), the 
most feasible approach to identify the employment impact of the German minimum wage is to rely 
on regional variation to which an area is affected by the wage floor. 
Figure 5 shows that there is heterogeneity in wage levels among Germany’s geographical 
areas, measured by the proportion of workers with hourly wages below €8.50 before the reform 
(the so-called Fraction). Thus, the key variable for the identification analysis proposed in this paper 
is the regional bite of the reform, which varies despite the legislative uniformity of the wage floor. 
The more strongly a region is affected by the minimum wage, the stronger the expected impact on 
wages and, in turn, the stronger the supposed reaction in the examined outcome. The causal effect 
can then be obtained in a difference-in-difference (DiD) framework, where it is captured by the 




The difference-in-difference framework is a methodology frequently used in 
microeconometrics in order to estimate the effect of a “treatment”, such as the introduction of a 
policy in a group of subjects (“treated”), which is compared to a second group of subjects not 
exposed to the treatment (“control” group). These two groups are observed during two different 
periods in time: before and after the introduction of the so called “treatment” (the Minimum Wage 
Reform in our case). Once the dataset is defined, the regression model has the following structure: 
 𝑦 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑑𝐵 + 𝛿0𝑑2 + 𝛿1𝑑2𝑑𝐵 + 𝑢 (1) 
Where y is the dependent variable, observed during the two periods in time 1 and 2; d2 is a 
dummy variable which is equal to 1 during the second period, 0 otherwise; dB is a dummy variable 
which is equal to 1 in the case of the “treated” subjects, 0 otherwise. In other terms, this last variable 
explains the existing differences between the control and the treatment group. The variable d2dB 
represents the interaction between d2 and dB, and it is equal to 1 when it refers to the treated 
subjects observed during the second period in time (after the introduction of the policy). The 
parameter of interest, which explains the effect of the treatment on the treated group, is the 
coefficient related to this last variable (𝛿1). The variable u refers to the error term. 
Therefore, the difference-in-difference estimation will be represented as follows: 
 𝛿1̂ = (𝑦𝐵,2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ − 𝑦𝐵,1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) − (𝑦𝐴,2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ − 𝑦𝐴,1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) (2) 
The dataset I created to apply the difference-in-difference estimation is constructed using 
SOEP data from individual surveys from year 2012 to 2017. Years from 2012 to 2014 are used as 
pre-treatment period, while the three following years consist in the period after the introduction of 
the policy. 
Since the statutory minimum wage in Germany is uniform in all regions and for basically 
all employees, identifying the reform’s effect on wages is not straightforward. The identification 
analysis suggested by Card (1992) proposes to estimate the causal effect of minimum wages on 
employment using regional differences in relative treatment intensity. There is no distinction 
between only two groups of treated and not treated subjects, rather a continuous variable that 
identify the different intensity of this treatment. Even though the minimum wage is uniform in all 
regions, hourly wage distributions are relatively different across RORs, giving variation in the bite 
variable, measured by the regional percentage of workers earning less than the minimum wage in 
the year prior to the reform. We expect to find that the reform has a larger impact on regional wages 
in higher-treated regions. 
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One threat to this type of identification strategy based on regional variation is the spatial 
dependance of regions, which creates a bias in the regional effects of the minimum wage reform. 
Controlling for region-specific GDP removes this estimation bias. Another threat is that the 
regional bite is correlated with regional economic performance, in the sense that if the minimum 
wage bites harder in economically weak regions, these should exhibit the highest wage adjustment. 
Therefore, the regression equation should include controls for economic performance, such as 
lagged region-specific GDP per capita. One more threat to the identification is given by changes in 
population, which held particular relevance in 2015 due to a large inflow of migrants. For this 
reason, I include region-specific population levels as a control variable in the regression. 
The regional treatment intensity is defined as the eligible share of employees paid less than 
the minimum wage prior to the reform (in 2014). These shares are derived from the SOEP. As bite 
indicator, I use the share of eligible employees with (both actual and contractual) hourly wages 
below the minimum wage threshold. Contractual hours are more accurate since actual hours could 
be more affected by measurement errors and in the SOEP it is asked individuals to give their gross 
monthly income, which should correspond to the wage stipulated in their contract. As seen before, 
the bite varies considerably between regions: East regions display higher treatment, while many 







3. The Short-Term Employment Effects of the German Minimum Wage 
Reform 
 
3.1. Data sources and implementation 
 
It is possible to evaluate the employment impact of the minimum wage reform on the basis 
of regional variation, through comprehensive wage data on the eligible work force, as well as 
employment stocks on the regional level. The analysis conducted following Card (1992) is 
implemented trough an alternative identification approach which considers regional variation that 
does not depend on differences in legislation. Each area has a different average wage, thus, the 
intensity with which wages need to change to adapt with the new minimum introduction is different 
for each region considered. If the minimum wage has a very high bite in a certain area, wages will 
have to adapt stronger, compared to other parts of Germany, and so the adaptation of labor demand 
will influence more significantly the employment size. This approach is applicable to the German 
case and, in order to control for regional trends before the introduction of the reform, data from the 
years 2012 to 2014 are needed. The subsequent empirical analysis relies on hourly wages, working 
hours, and monthly earnings before and after 2015. Data are collected from the German Socio-
Economic Panel (SOEP), an ongoing representative longitudinal panel survey with about 30,000 
survey participants in 15,000 households per year. The SOEP measures differences in resources 
across individuals, not only at specific points in time but also across the life course. It was 
established in 1984 and located at the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin), 
providing representative longitudinal data of private households in Germany for a global research 
community.  The SOEP has expanded its scope over the years: it now provides both a broad set of 
self-reported “objective” variables, such as income, age, gender, education, employment status, or 
gripping force, and a broad set of self-reported “subjective” variables, such as from satisfaction 
with life, over fairness and reciprocity perceptions to psychological measurement. It is then a 
valuable empirical basis for researchers to explore long-time societal changes; relationships 
between early life events on later life outcomes; interdependencies between the individual and the 
family or household; mechanisms of inter-generational mobility and transmission; accumulation 
processes of resources; short- and long-term effects of institutional change and policy reforms; 
speed of convergence between East and West or between migrants and natives. Summing up, SOEP 
is a comprehensive multi-dimensional database to understand human behavior and decision making 
in varying social as well as institutional settings and policy regimes. 
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The legislation sets the minimum wage on an hourly basis, leading to a number of problems 
for evaluations and compliance studies. In order to estimate how many people are affected by the 
minimum wage and what their wages are, the availability of comprehensive information on 
earnings and working hours is needed. The Minimum Wage reform establishes a certain minimum 
level for hourly wages; thus, corresponding data will be crucial for the calculation of the bite. 
Information on this variable is needed also before any potential anticipation took place. Hourly 
wages are not retrieved directly in the SOEP but can be calculated dividing the gross monthly 
wages by regular weekly working hours, multiplied by average weeks per month. The SOEP 
includes both contractual and actual (paid and unpaid overtime) weekly working time. Individuals 
in industries granted a period of transition to adapt own minimum wages below the new minimum 
level of €8.50 are especially complex to identify. These difficulties hold also for long-term 
unemployed, minors and individual interns, since their exemptions relies on very specific 
circumstances which cannot be captured easily in the data. For all these reasons, estimating non-
compliance is not straightforward, as it depends on various assumptions made and the data source 
used. 
Different evaluations of eligible employees still earning less than the wage floor imply that 
non-compliance with the minimum wage is an important issue in the analysis. Using SOEP data, 
Mindestlohnkommission (2018b) estimates 2.1 million employees still earning less than €8.50 in 
2015 (and 1.8 million in 2016). 
The following analysis is based on the crucial assumption that the geographical structure 
of the bite varies across German areas. The SOEP contains a great deal of geographically 
referenced indicators and regional information. SOEP contains variables that indicate the area in 
which survey respondents live at the time of the (household) interview. The values of these 
variables refer to official geographical units used either by German administrative bodies or by the 
postal service (Deutsche Post AG) to deliver mail to households in Germany. On the basis of these 
unique identifiers, it is possible, in principle, to match SOEP data with official, scientific or 
commercial macro-data at these levels. Regional policy regions (Raumordnungsregionen, ROR) 
are spatial units defined by the Federal Office for Building and Regional Planning (Bundesamt für 
Bauwesen und Raumordnung, BBR2) to differentiate areas in Germany based on their economic 
interlinkages. There are 96 different regional policy regions in Germany. Indicators at this 
geographical level represent the core element of the SOEP geocode data module of SOEP. For 
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SOEP users in Europe, access to this module containing regional information is conditional on 
submitting a special data protection plan and signing a data distribution contract. 
A rigorous and comprehensive assessment of the minimum wage effects requires that the 
data should provide information on hourly wages and represent the entire eligible population. To 
compute the following analysis, it was necessary to merge the dataset containing all the information 
regarding work and employment of the interviewed individuals and households with the dataset 
that links the different households’ codes through years to the RORs in which they live. In this way 
I was able to identify each individual’s ROR. I merged the two different datasets using households’ 
code and year as key variables to assign the geographical location to the individuals, which results 
in 670,157 observations matched. Besides the inclusion of time- and region-fixed effects, I also 
used logarithmic GDP and population to control for regional differences, assuming that a region’s 
economic power and population size have a strong impact on employment. These variables are 
taken from Destatis (2016b) since they are not included in the SOEP data. In this way, the dataset 
I created contains a total of 175,188 observations of individuals through 2012 to 2017 in all 96 
Germany’s ROR. 
 
3.2. Anticipation and common trend analysis 
 
The longitudinal SOEP data allows to evaluate wages in years prior to the introduction of 
the reform, and this is relevant for the analysis because we should expect diverging changes in 
employment if wages adapt to the new minimum floor, set by the reform. The difference-in-
differences analysis does not only imply a common trend concerning employment, but also in 
wages: for the construction of such analysis, in the absence of the introduction of the policy reform, 
wages and thus employment would have developed equally in all German areas. In order to 
examine whether those variables show equal trends in pre-treatment time frame, following 
Caliendo (2019), I divided all the considered regions into three different groups, depending on their 
bite level: low-, medium- and high-bite areas, according to SOEP data for year 2014. The cut points 
in the respective bites are set at specific levels, such that each group of regions comprises the same 
number of subjects (the 33rd and the 67th percentile). The graphical examination of these trends 
allows us to notice that Fraction in high-bite areas is significantly higher compared to the other 
regions, as the share of workers who earn less than €8.50 is above 15%, while it has been between 
6 and 12% in low- and medium-areas between 2012 and 2014. In the pre-treatment years, Fraction 
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steadily remained large in high-bite areas, while it slightly changed in the other regions. However, 
overall, trends have been similar across Germany’s region. 
Figure 6 shows that from 2015 on, after the minimum wage introduction, common trends 
do not hold anymore, as expected. Fraction decreased by around 5% in and high-bite regions, and 
by around 3% in medium-bite regions while it remained more or less constant in low-bite areas. 
This evidence suggests that there is a positive wage effect in dependence of the regional bite level. 
The average Fraction in high-bite areas was approximately 23% in 2014, but it did not decrease to 
zero after the introduction of the policy reform. The same happened for medium- and low-bite 
areas, showing that the adaptation of wages, and thus Fraction, had not been executed completely 
in early 2015. Overall, in particular for low-bite regions, bite level changed only marginally after 
2014 and did not significantly differ between regional categories. 
These patterns reflect what already suggested by the available data, which shows a 
substantial amount of non-compliance in the short-run. This poses a problem for effect evaluations 
since possible impacts of the introduction of the minimum wage might be underestimated if there 
is non-compliance. It also highlights that the enforcement of the wage floor regulations was 
insufficient and that a number of issues should be considered when implementing a wage floor 
regulation. First, the policy should be designed in a way that facilitates also the monitoring of 
compliance, thus it should be considered whether the chosen measure (hourly wages in this case) 
is easily verifiable in employers’ records. Moreover, the legislation should include regulation in 
order to enforce the minimum wage and take strong precautions such that employers’ 
circumvention is difficult. 
Since the analysis conducted in this paper assumes that also employment would have 
followed the same trend in absence of the reform, it is interesting to look at this dimension too. I 
divided all German regions into three groups, depending on their bite level, setting the threshold at 
the 33rd and 67th percentile.  The three graphs in Figure 7 show the average logarithmic levels for 
the three employment types: overall, regular and marginal. It is possible to notice that both overall 
and regular log employment show significant lower values in high-bite regions, which is a sign of 
different population levels across the region types. However, the groups share a joint trend over 
the years prior to the introduction of the reform, meaning that German areas would have developed 
in a similar way in the absence of the minimum wage. This holds true for the whole time horizon, 
even after the introduction of the wage floor. The common trend in employment holds also for 
mini-jobs, even though the differences between high-bite areas and the other areas are more 
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pronounced. There appears to be a slightly decline in marginal employment between 2014 and 





Figure 6. Level of bite within high-, medium-, and low-wage regions. Source: SOEP 2012-2017, own calculations. Each region has 

















Figure 7. Mean of log employment level within high-, medium-, and low-bite regions. Source: SOEP 2012-2017 own calculations. 




3.3. Descriptive statistics 
 
Card (1992) and Stewart (2002) in their paper look at employment-to-population ratio to 
analyze the effect of the minimum wage on employment size. In this paper, I decided to estimate 
employment effects using log employment level as the dependent variable, since the employment-
to-population ratio is affected also by changes in the population, not only in employment levels. In 
2015 a large inflow of migrants held particular relevance; therefore, I analyze the log employment 
level including population levels as a control variable. 
Only if different areas are affected differently can wage effects and thus employment effects 
be identified by the suggested model. The definition of the Bite is then another important crucial 
step to understand the following analysis. I previously presented two different measures: the Kaitz 
index and the Fraction. The former measures the ratio between the minimum wage and the regional 
mean wage. The latter represents the share of eligible employees who earn less than the new 
minimum. The development of the Kaitz is not only determined by changes caused by the minimum 
wage, but also by movement in other parts of the wage distribution will affect its value. The 
Fraction is focused on the group of affected individuals, showing how many of the working 
population eligible is actually affected by it. The Fraction thus neglects the density below the wage 
floor since it does not indicate the distance of the low-wage workers from the threshold. Both the 
Kaitz and the Fraction reflect the significant structural differences between East and West Germany 
since the bite is considerably higher in the Eastern part. While the overall picture remains roughly 
the same, the Kaitz displays more variation within the region of Bavaria than the Fraction. There 
are also some other light differences due to the fact that the Kaitz index measures the ratio between 
the minimum and the average wage, since it only decreases when the average wage is in fact 
increased. In this analysis I used the Fraction to construct the bite measure on a scale from 0 to 1. 
The dataset I created is obtained merging the two different datasets in the SOEP: one 
contains information on work and employment and the other displays information on the 
geographical location of those same individuals responding to the surveys. I then computed my 
first variable of interest, the gross monthly income (summarized in Table 2), as it was crucial to 
the calculation of the bite, which represents the continuous treatment variable that I used in my 
difference-in-differences framework. In order to limit measurement errors, I apply a top and bottom 
recoding at the first and last percentile. The distribution of many statistics can be heavily influenced 
by outliers. Winsorizing is the transformation of statistics by limiting extreme values in the 
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statistical data to reduce the effect of possibly spurious outliers. I used this strategy since the 
distribution of gross monthly income was not realistic since it contained very low values close to 
1, probably corresponding to measurement errors or wrong answers given by individuals. 
 
Table 2. Gross monthly income 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Income 90,655 2575.775 1916.799 72 10,000 
Summary statistics for gross monthly income. 
 
Hourly wages are not retrieved directly in the SOEP but can be calculated using the ratio 
of gross monthly income and weekly working hours, adjusted by average weeks per month. The 
SOEP contains both information on contractual weekly working hours, stipulated in the contracts, 
and actual weekly working hours, which include also paid and unpaid overtime. Using actual hours 
would be more accurate since the minimum wage needs to be paid for any working time. However, 
in the SOEP, individuals are asked to give information about weekly working hours in general and 
for income for the previous month, leading to possible measurement errors due to mismatch 
between these two variables. Therefore, the following analysis focuses on contractual wages. I 
winsorized also this variable not to include some extreme values due to measurement errors. 
  
Table 3. Weekly contractual hours 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Hours 95,870 35.92 13.767 4 70 
Summary statistics for weekly contractual working hours. 
 
The analysis has been conducted considering only the two main different categories of 
employment in Germany: marginal and regular. I counted the employment level for each ROR 
according to the number of employed respondents to the survey and assigned to the category of 
regular employed those who classified as full-time or part-time, while those who has mini-jobs as 
marginally employed. There are some other categories of employment contained in the SOEP data 
that I did not consider in my analysis. I excluded those workers belonging to the following 
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categories: vocational training; near retirement, zero working hours; voluntary military service; 
voluntary service; sheltered workshop; not employed; internship; completing compulsory military 
service. The reason is that some specific groups of workers were excluded from the minimum wage 
reform, namely the self-employed, trainees, specific types of interns, minors without vocational 
training, volunteers and the long-term unemployed. I obtained a total sample of 98,487 individuals, 
with the majority of them belonging to the category of full-time employment (64.09%) and of 
regular employment in general (89.17%), while only 10.83% of individuals is assigned to the 
category of marginal employment, as shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Employment status 
Employment Status Frequency Percentage Cumulative 
Full-Time Employment 63,120 64.09 64.09 
Regular Part-Time Employment 24,701 25.08 89.17 
Marginal Employment 10,666 10.83 100.00 
Total 98,487 100.00  
Total observations and percentage of employment status. 
 
Table 5. Hourly wages 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Hourly wages 15,071 5.999 2.031 0.245 8.492 
Summary statistics for hourly wages below €8.50.  
 
I then compute hourly wages of individuals as explained above, dividing the gross monthly 
income by the weekly contractual hours, adjusted by the average weeks per month. Table 5 
summarizes the statistics found for hourly wages below the wage floor set by the reform. 
As previously mentioned, I based the analysis on an area classification characterized by the 
96 planning regions (ROR), which divide Germany into segregated regions by commuter flows 
and economic structure and are defined by the federal states according to their own regulations. In 
this way, each individual is assigned to one region. The smaller the area classification, the better 
the heterogeneous labor market performances and their variation can be captured, although it is 
more likely that the economic structure of one region is not picked up accurately. The 401 
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administrative districts would account for this diversity more accurately, but they are also more 
prone to high commuter flows. The RORs are then the most appropriate geographical classification 
to divide Germany in restricted areas, keeping the number of observations high and maintaining 
measures like GDP per capita still valuable to reflect the actual economic performance of a region. 
In order to move from individual data to regional data, I counted the number of individuals 
employed in the selected categories above (regular and marginal employment) and the number of 
those employed individuals earning an hourly wage below €8.50. Dividing the number of 
individuals with an hourly wage below the new minimum and the total number of people employed 
for each ROR in all the years from 2012 to 2017, I computed the Fraction, the bite measure selected 
for my analysis. The regional bites for year 2014 (summarized in Table 6), the year prior to the 
introduction of the reform, are the ones that I used as treatment effect to estimate the impact of the 
reform on employment in the subsequent years. In this way I obtained my final dataset with 576 
observations, 96 observations for the RORs in every year that ranges from 2012 to 2017. 
 
Table 6. Regional bites 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Regional Bites 576 0.1598 0.0659 0.0244 0.4167 
Summary statistics for regional bite level. 
 
Table 7. Bite in 2014 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Bites 2014 96 0.1757 0.0615 0.0269 0.3718 
Summary statistics for regional bite level in 2014. 
 
Going back to the initial hypothesis of the analysis, we should expect that heterogeneous 
wage effects between regions can cause varying adaptation in employment. Overall employment 
is given by the sum of regular (full-time and part-time jobs) and marginal employment. Since I 
only have the total employment head count, it is not easy to differentiate between sectors exempted 
from the national minimum wage and non-exempted industries. Individuals in industries granted a 
transition period to adapt own minimum wages below €8.50 are especially difficult to identify. The 
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same is true also for long-term unemployed since their exemption relies on particular circumstances 
which are not fully captured in the surveys. For all these reasons, estimating non-compliance is not 
straightforward and depends on the assumptions made. Many evaluations of compliance find a 
considerable number of eligible workers who earn less than the new minimum in the years 
following its introduction. According to estimates derived from contractual wages in the SOEP, 
about 14% of employees were earning less than €8.50 during the first half of 2015 and around 12% 
in 2016. The Mindestlohnkommission (2018) estimates respectively 2.1 and 1.8 workers earning 
less than the minimum wage for 2015 and 2016. Even though these results have to be treated with 
caution because of measurement errors, they imply a considerable importance in non-compliance 
with the wage floor. 
 
3.4. Employment effects 
 
3.4.1. Results on different categories of employment 
 
After looking at the employment dynamics descriptively, I will now apply a fixed-effects 
estimation to analyze employment effects of the new minimum wage in a difference-in-differences 
framework. I derived the following estimation: 
 𝐸𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽1𝑖  𝑇𝑖 × 𝐵𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑗,20142017𝑖=2012 + 𝛿1𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑅 + 𝑇 + 𝑣𝑗,𝑡  (1) 
Where 𝐸𝑗,𝑡 represents the log employment level for each ROR in year t (where time t goes 
from year 2012 to 2017), calculated according to the SOEP data. I repeated the regression using 
not only overall employment level, but also distinguishing between different groups of workers. 
As previously mentioned, I estimate the effects of the introduction of the reform on overall 
employment, as well as on regular and marginal employment separately, in order to analyze the 
possible different effects that the reform had on the main subcategories of workers in Germany. As 
predicted by economists, marginal employed are expected to be affected more by the reform since 
their monthly wage is by definition lower than a certain level. The treatment effects are denoted by 
the coefficients of the interaction terms between the bite calculated in 2014 and the years (𝛽1𝑖 , 
where i goes from 2012 to 2017). I am especially interested in the coefficient of the interaction 
term between the bite and the year 2015, as it identifies the effect on employment in the year of the 
67 
 
introduction of the minimum wage reform. However, I also include years 2016 and 2017 to 
estimates short term effects in the years following the introduction of the policy. In order to control 
for pre-treatment trends, I used years 2012 and 2013, such that my observation period ranges from 
2012 to 2017. The reference year remains fixed at 2014 and all the interaction terms between the 
bite in 2014 and the other years are related to the same year. I also include the regions and the 
years’ dummies (respectively R and T) in order to control for those factors that should be attributed 
to single regions or specific years. Besides the inclusion of time- and region- fixed effects, I also 
include controls for regional differences in logarithmic GDP in t, according to the assumption that 
the economic power of a specific ROR will have an impact on its employment size, and logarithmic 
population in t since employment is also obviously affected by population size. Standard errors are 

























Table 8. Overall employment 
Panel A: Overall employment 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Bite x y2012   
-0.0025 
(0.243) 
Bite x y2013   
-0.3765*** 
(0.134) 






































Region and Year FE YES YES YES 
Observations 576 576 576 
R2 0.9826 0.9829 0.9830 
Note: Robust standard error in parentheses, *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Dependent variable is overall employment in 













Table 9. Regular employment 
Panel B: Regular employment 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Bite x y2012   
-0.1520 
(0.266) 
Bite x y2013   
-0.3805** 
(0.164) 






































Region and Year FE YES YES YES 
Observations 576 576 576 
R2 0.9827 0.9831 9831 
Note: Robust standard error in parentheses, *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Dependent variable is regular employment in 













Table 10. Marginal employment 
Panel C: Marginal employment 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Bite x y2012   
1.1696 
(1.097) 
Bite x y2013   
-0.0365 
(0.901) 






































Region and Year FE YES YES YES 
Observations 576 576 576 
R2 0.8796 0.8798 0.8806 
Note: Robust standard error in parentheses, *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Dependent variable is marginal employment in 








Table 8, Table 9, and Table 10 show the coefficients of interest that explain the employment 
effects of the minimum wage, with their robust standard errors, as well as the number of 
observations, the inclusion of time- and region-fixed effects, and the R2. Each Table present a 
specific panel: Panel A exhibit the result of the regression on overall employment, Panel B focuses 
on the subcategory of marginal employment, while Panel C shows the results only for regular 
employment, the sum of full-time and part-time workers. Column (1) reports all the coefficients of 
the interaction terms between the continuous variable bite (in 2014) and years of the post reform 
period, from 2015 to 2017. Column (2) presents the employment effects in the same years, adding 
controls for GDP per capita and population. Column (3) repeats the same results, also including 
the coefficients of the interaction between the bite in 2014 and years 2012 and 2013, to control for 
pre-treatment trends and test the common trend assumption, such that observations range from year 
2012 to 2017. The reference years always remains fixed in 2014. The interaction between the bite 
and the year 2014 is omitted because of collinearity, while all the other interaction terms between 
bite and years have to be interpreted in relation to the year 2014. Total observations are given by 
each ROR’s observation (96 in total) per year, from 2012 to 2017. 
As shown above, from my own calculation, the average level for the bite in 2014, the year 
before the introduction of the minimum wage reform, was 17.6%, meaning that more than one in 
ten employees in Germany was affected. According to the classical theory, if the labor market is 
better represented by the perfectly competitive model, this intervention is expected to lead to an 
extensive job destruction in Germany. The aim of this analysis is to examine whether these 
expectations have actually proven to be true in the short term. However, the effect of the 
introduction of a wage floor on labor demand, and thus employment, depend on the market 
structure. In a competitive price-taker setting, the results would suggest negative effects on 
employment, but, if the labor market is considered to be monopsonistic, the effects on employment 
are not necessarily negative. According to recent studies presented in the previous chapters, my 
expectations on the results are not to find a massive reduction on jobs, as the demand for labor may 
also increase when employees are paid below their marginal product of labor. 
The coefficients of the interactions have to be interpreted as the percentage change in 
employment when the Fraction (the bite) increases by one percentage point ceteris paribus. 
According to theory, my expectations are then not to find strong significative negative values, 
rather small variations which could also be positive. Column (1) presents the employment effects 
without controls for GDP and population, which are included in columns (2) and (3). Since 
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population would have affected employment in the absence of the policy reform, I considered 
fundamental to control for the current population level. There is a direct interrelation between 
population and employment level, meaning that population size in t explains a great share of 
variation in employment. This becomes even more relevant considering the large inflow of 
migrants in 2015. I expected that controlling for GDP would not have the same impact since 
regional differences in economic power seem to be already controlled for by regional fixed effects. 
Column (3) additionally includes years 2012 and 2013, which allow me to revisit the common 
trend assumption and to control for pre-treatment trends. The coefficient for the interaction term in 
2012 is not significative, supporting the assumption previously made, which states that regions 
followed the same trend before the introduction of the policy reform. Nevertheless, the coefficient 
for the interaction in 2013 is significative, however, since Column (3) in Panel A and Panel B 
identify a slight increase in regular and overall employment already from 2013 to 2014, we need 
to be cautious with the interpretation. With the reference year 2014, an increase by one percent in 
the Fraction translates to 0.38% less overall and marginal employment in 2013, pointing to the fact 
that employment already increased in highly affected regions even before the minimum wage 
introduction. Only in the case of marginal jobs, as shown by the coefficients of interaction in Panel 
C, the common trend analysis is verified, as the coefficients for the years before the introduction 
of the reform are not significative. The estimation in column (3) is the more extensive and will 
serve as my preferred specification. 
From the results I obtained I cannot conclude that the introduction of the minimum wage 
reform in 2015 had an impact on employment size since the coefficients of the interaction terms 
between the bite in 2014 and years are not significative. The results do not suggest that the effects 
are negative and that the reform has a strong impact on employed population, accordingly to the 
monopsony literature analyzed in this paper, but I can neither conclude what are the effects of the 
minimum wage. The standard errors are too big and do not allow me to state what is the impact on 
employment, even though the coefficients of interaction between the bite and year 2016 in Column 
(2) of Panel A and Panel B are significative and signal a slight positive employment effect of the 
minimum wage in the year after the introduction of the reform. 
If the coefficients obtained in column (3) would be significative, I could not only assess if 
employment is affected in a positive or negative way by the minimum wage, depending on the sign 
of the value reported, but those results would allow me to translate the estimated treatment effects 
into aggregated effects. In order to provide a benchmark for the absolute nationwide impact of the 
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minimum wage and to predict the relative and absolute employment effect for the German labor 
market, we could multiply the estimated treatment effects with the regional bite level. In this way, 
it is possible to find the relative employment effects, which are put in relation to the employment 
level in 2014 to estimate absolute effects. The results would then tell us, on average, what is the 
relative reduction in overall employment in percentage points, and also the estimation of the actual 
head count of the number of jobs loss due to the wage floor. 
I then analyzed separately marginal and regular employment, as mini-jobs are of special 
interest for the wage evaluation since the effects are expected to be larger for this group. Panel B 
shows the effects of the introduction of the minimum wage on regular employment, while Panel C 
focuses only on mini-jobs. This last type of employment is characterized by monthly income up to 
€450, and for this reason it is of specific interest for the analysis. Marginal employed earn low 
gross hourly wages and pay small social security contributions. The regression is structured in the 
same way of the one for overall employment, but the dependent variable only accounts for those 
individuals who belong to the category of marginal employed, excluding in this case part-time and 
full-time employment. 
Table 3 shows the number of observations of individuals employed and the percentage for 
the three different groups. It is clear how results for regular employed will be much more similar 
to the results analyzed for overall employment before since the percentage of mini-jobs is only 
10.83%. From the common trend analysis, it emerged that marginal employment already declined 
in highly-affected regions even before the introduction of the reform. My expectations were to find 
a stronger negative effects from 2015 on, indicating that the additional reduction is due to the 
introduction of the wage floor. I decided to look at these two groups of workers separately also to 
disentangle effects on the regular employed from effects on the generally more affected marginally 
employed. With the minimum wage introduction and the corresponding wage effect, some 
marginally employed exceed the threshold of €450 if their working hours are not reduced 
simultaneously. When exceeding the threshold a worker can switch to a midi-job, defined by an 
income between €450 and €850. A reduction in mini-jobs does not necessarily result in rising 
unemployment, but may be associated with an increase in the demand for regular employment. My 
expectations from the estimation were then to find a shift from mini-jobs to part time employment, 
with a small negative value for the coefficients of Panel C, while almost no effect in the case 
analyzed in Panel B. However, the coefficients of the interaction terms between the bite in 2014 
and other years for regular and marginal employment are not significative, thus I cannot conclude 
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how the reform affected these two categories differently. Nevertheless, these result go in the right 
direction, since it is possible to assess that the non significative coefficients may be caused by 
monopsonistic aspects of the German labor market. Accordingly, the model of monopsony predicts 
that the introduction of a minimum wage does not affect employment as in the case of a competitive 
labor market. Moreover, the coefficients obtained have very low values, making the impact of the 
minimum wage neglectible even in the case of significative levels. 
 
3.4.2. Results by gender 
 
Joan Robinson’s original application of monopsony was to gender pay gap and Manning 
supported the research on this issue, finding that the quit elasticity of women is, on average, lower 
than that for men, implying that firm owners can exercise more their market power over females 
than males, perhaps because women face greater constraints on the jobs they can take, mainly due 
to households’ responsibilities. Given the over-representation of women in low-wage occupations, 
minimum wages can also make a significant contribution towards lower gender pay gaps. An 
important assumption in order for this intervention to reduce gender inequality is that the labor 
market policies do not directly or indirectly discriminate against vulnerable group of workers, for 
example by setting lower wage floors in sectors held by women. 
I repeated the same estimation, looking at the overall employment level of females and 
males separately, to capture the impact of the wage floor on these groups. The total number of 
observations decreased compared to the previous estimation divided by category of workers since 
I discarded all those regions that resulted in less than 30 observations after separating the 
population by gender. In this way I have a total of 509 observation in the final dataset for females 
and 504 observations for males, while I only considered 89 ROR observation in 2014 for females 
and 67 for males. Analyzing the summary statistics in Table 11 and Table 12 for the bite in 2014 
for men and women, it is clear that the average regional share of women earning a wage lower than 






Table 11. Women's bite in 2014 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Bite 2014 Female 89 0.2354 0.0721 0.0882 0.4516 
Summary statistics for women's regional bite level in 2014. 
 
Table 12. Men's bite in 2014 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Bite 2014 Male 67 0.1765 0.0607 0.0469 0.3718 
Summary statistics for men's regional bite level in 2014. 
 
Table 13. Males and Females 
 
Males Females 








































Region and Year FE YES YES 
Observations 504 509 
R2 0.9659 0.9723 
Note: Robust standard error in parentheses, *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Dependent variable is overall employment (divided by 




The coefficients of the interaction terms between the bite and years shown in Table 13 are 
not significative for the estimation of employment effects for both males and females. Therefore, I 
cannot conclude that women suffered more by a reduction in their employment level due to the fact 
that their average wage level is lower, and thus the treatment intensity is higher, as shown by the 
summary statistics above. However, as in the previous estimation that distinguish individuals by 
their type of employment, this may be a sign of monopsonistic aspects of the labor market, which 
make it unclear the employment effects of the introduction of a minimum wage. Also, in the 
estimation divided by gender, the coefficients present low values, which do not impact employment 
even in the case of significative results. 
 
3.4.3. Results by level of education 
 
Additionally, I evaluate the employment effect of the minimum wage reform, looking at 
the different impact it has on two different categories of individuals, according to their education 
level. Through the variable that assess if the individuals obtained a university degree or not, I 
divided the RORs into two percentiles: low and high percent of degrees. In the years before the 
introduction of the reform, the number of respondents that obtained a degree is too low and I was 
not able to compute the coefficients of the interaction between the bite in 2014 and those years. 
Therefore, I only tested the common trend assumption for low education, which is not completely 
verified since the coefficients for 2013 is significative, meaning that employment was already 
affected by some anticipation effects before the introduction of the reform in 2015. However, the 
coefficient is not highly significative, and for 2012 the common trend assumption is verified. 
Dividing population in these two percentiles I would expect that low education individuals 
earn on average an hourly wage lower if compared to the other percentile of population with a 
higher percentage of individuals that obtained a university degree. Therefore, according to my 
expectations, low education should display a stronger negative employment effect (or less positive) 
compared to high education. 
 The sign of the coefficients of the interaction terms between the bite in 2014 and other 
years are in line with my ex-ante expectations. Looking at the results for low education in Table 
14, the estimation suggests that an increase by one percentage point in the Fraction in 2014 results 
in a decrease in the employment level of the population for all years considered, particularly for 
2017. Comparing these results with high education, we can see how the sign of the coefficients 
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suggests the opposite impact of the minimum wage on employment: an increase in the bite in 2014 
have a positive effect on employment for all the years after the introduction of the reform. The 
coefficients are not significative; therefore, I cannot conclude that low education individuals 
suffered more by a reduction in their employment level due to the fact that the level of their wages 
was indeed lower, and they were affected more by the reform. The only significative coefficient is 
the one of the interaction between the bite and year 2017 for high education, suggesting that in the 
short term, those individuals benefit from positive employment effects, which may signal 




Table 14. Low and High Education 
 
Low Education High Education 






































Region and Year FE YES YES 
Observations 128 213 
R2 0.9764 0.9930 
Note: Robust standard error in parentheses, *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Dependent variable is overall employment (divided by 









The Statement of President Ursula Von Der Leyen made it clear how it is becoming more 
and more relevant to ensure equality and fairness in the labor market. One of the probably reasons 
for the current revival interests in monopsony is anxiety about the rise in equality, the fall in labor 
share and a vaguer feeling that the balance of power between workers and employers in the labor 
market has shifted to the advantage of business. Although not monopsony in the strictest sense, 
labor markets are characterized by important elements of monopsony power and this issue is 
becoming clear beyond any reasonable doubt. There still is a number of economists who stick to 
the view that assumes labor markets as better represented by the perfectly competitive model, but 
several studies estimated considerable amount of market power. According to these researches, 
labor market interventions by the government would not result in a social welfare loss, but they 
could improve total benefits. The introduction of a statutory minimum wage is the instrument 
analyzed in this paper, trying to predict what the effects could be, taking into account the 
assumption that the labor market could actually be characterized by monopsonistic aspects. In this 
sense, not only it would result in an increse in the level of average wages, but also employment 
effects could be positive since employees are paid below the marginal product of labor beforehand.  
The introduction of the Minimum Wage Reform in Germany was preceded by long debates 
about the expectations – predominantly negative – on employment effects. Critics of the reform 
predicted a massive job loss in the long-run, while those in favor of the reform considered 
fundamental to intervene in the labor market to reduce the rising wage inequality in Germany. The 
choice of the identification strategy used to estimate the employment effects of the minimum wage 
is complicated, due to the fact that the reform applies equally to all German areas and there are 
very few exemptions. Almost every employee in every region is affected by the wage floor, 
reducing the set of potential identification strategies. Following the identification approach 
proposed by Card (1992), which considers regional variation that does not depend on differences 
in legislation, it is possible to evince that the stronger that a minimum wage ‘bites’ into the regional 
wage distribution, the stronger the regional labor market is affected, and so should be the adaptation 
of labor demand. The imposition of a national wage standard implies the "treatment effect" varies 
across states depending on the fraction of workers initially earning less than the new minimum. 
Across regions, earnings and wages differences are caused by structural and environmental 
diversity. The regional treatment intensity is defined as the eligible share of employees paid less 
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than the minimum wage prior to the reform (in 2014). My data source is the longitudinal German 
Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), which measures differences in resources across individuals, not 
only at specific points in time but also across the life course. I use the SOEP also to analyze 
potential anticipation effects and verify that regional wages and employment levels would have 
followed a common trend in the absence of the reform. 
I estimate employment effects on population, analyzing if the minimum wage affected 
differently various categories of individuals. First, I looked at the impact of the minimum wage on 
three categories of employment (overall, regular and marginal) controlling for GDP per capita and 
population size. The coefficients of the interaction terms between regional bites in 2014 and years 
show the percentage change in employment when the Fraction increases by one percent. The values 
obtained are not significative, except for the coefficient of the interaction with year 2013, 
suggesting that the common trend analysis is not verified for overall and regular employment, but 
only for marginal. This means that there were some anticipation effects even before the 
introduction of the reform in 2015. However, the values obtained signal only small variation of 
employment due to the wage floor and the fact that they are not significative may suggest that the 
labor market is indeed characterized by monopsonistic aspects since, according to the theoretical 
model of monopsony, it is not possible to predict what are the effects when the government sets a 
certain level of wages. In the case of the perfectly competitive model, on the other hand, I would 
expect to find highly significative negative employment effects. 
I then looked also at the different impact the reform had on men and women, as it makes 
sense to expect a stronger impact on employment for women since their average bite calculated is 
way higher than that for men. This should affect more demand for labor of females, resulting in a 
negative impact in employment, or less positive compared to men’s estimation. Again, the 
coefficients of the interaction between bite in 2014 and years are not significative. Finally, I looked 
at results for two more categories of individuals: I divided RORs into two percentiles according to 
the share of population that obtained a university degree. I expected stronger employment effects 
for low education individuals than for high education since their hourly wage is on average lower, 
meaning that the first category is more affected by the introduction of the minimum wage reform. 
In this case the coefficients are in line with my expectations. The sign for low education is negative, 
while employment effects for high education seem to be positive. Nevertheless, the coefficients are 
not significative, except from the one of the interaction between the bite in 2014 and year 2017 for 
high education. This may signal that the labor market is characterized by imperfect competition. 
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Although my results do not display significative coefficients, the values obtained are quite 
different from the negative predictions of 500,000 to 900,000 job losses. One possible explanation 
could be that I only identify short-term effects, while the effects predicted in ex-ante studies 
considers a longer period. However, another reason for job losses to have failed may be given by 
the fact that other channels of adjustments were chosen, such as the reduction in working hours.  
Anyway, one relevant explanation is the possible existence of a monopsony, where the current 
minimum wage lies below the marginal product of labor, resulting in no job losses, as predicted by 
the theory. Moreover, the adaptation of the wage floor from €8.50 to €8.84 and then €9.35 
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